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The Static Future of the Current International Financial System

Section 1: Introduction/Thesis Discussion
There has been a great debate over the effectiveness and stability of the
current floating exchange rate regime as the international monetary system
(since its inception in 1973). Over the last thirty years, most economists have
looked to amend, change, and overhaul the floating exchange system in favor of
a pegged or rigid exchange rate system that characterized the predominate
financial systems before 1973. The perceived decline of the American dollar as
an international reserve currency has recently resulted in increased debate over
the future of the international monetary system. The international financial
system has gone through three major upheavals in its history and many
economists have determined that it is due for a fourth. Many economists look to
predict international finance’s future in the golden ages of the past, while they
should be concerned with the adaptability and strength of the current
international monetary system. The thesis of this paper is that the ability to adapt
to constant change and politically motivated economic decisions makes a floating
exchange rate regime the best choice for the future of the globally
interdependent international monetary system.
Many economists seem to think that the current monetary system is
headed for instability, failure, and eventual change in the face of a weakening
dollar, ever increasing capital flows, short term instability, and the always
precarious euro. There will be a time when change overhauls the international
monetary system, but that day has not yet come. No international monetary
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system has been able to adapt to shocks better than the current floating
exchange rate system and this paper analyzes why this trend, will hold steady.
The future of the international monetary system will be one that is characterized
by flexibility and an impending static trend.
The advent of International Finance was not a singular comprehensive
economic event but instead a slow blossoming of interdependent financial
relationships between governments around the world, as the result of trade and
economic interaction on the national level. Slowly a framework of systems,
money, and rules grew into what we characterize today as the international
monetary system. The international financial system has had essentially three
major regimes that have characterized its history and from which its future will
most definitely be determined. The gold standard, the Breton-Woods system, and
the floating exchange rate system have all experienced triumphs, weaknesses,
changes, and evaluations. In this paper, I contend that the current managed
floating monetary system will change over time, but remain the dominant
international arrangement because of its proven flexibility and historical evidence
that there is currently no better alternative. In this globally interdependent
economy, countries act independently in their own best interest to create the best
possible economic conditions domestically. A floating exchange rate is the only
system that can withstand the uncertainty of the world’s current economic
decisions.
The long run cooperation between nations that it would take to usher in a
new international finance system is not likely after so many years of
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independence. The international financial system will remain static in the long run
because the major economic powers of the world will not be able to agree on a
system that is mutually and domestically beneficial for all the countries involved.
The United States currently enjoys many benefits under the current system and it
would have to be the catalyst of change in any scenario that would involve the
upheaval and uncertainty a new financial system would bring upon the world.
While Bretton Woods provides a historical example of such an agreement, such
a scenario is not likely unless a major political and economic crisis vaults the
current system into prolonged chaos and uncertainty. The interwar period that
preceded the Bretton-Woods agreement was a unique time of international
ambiguity in history that paved the way for an international agreement and will
not likely be repeated anytime in the near future.
Direction of Paper and Argument
In today’s international finance, conditions and circumstances change
frequently and often times without notice, making economic research and data
often times obsolete and inapplicable for use in the future because the system is
in a state of constant change. One of the best ways to analyze the international
monetary system is through its historical past because one can determine faults
and weaknesses when change is held constant at one exact point of time.
Constant change makes a monetary system that is adaptable a necessity in
today’s world and fixed exchange rates provide anything but flexibility as an
exchange rate system. Fixed exchange rates put pressure on nations to maintain
fundamentally flawed systems, which usually leads to the critical failure of an
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economic system as we have seen with two previous exchange rate regimes
before the adaption of the current floating system. Based on my analysis of the
history of the international monetary system, a floating exchange rate system is
the only economically responsible and viable choice for the future of the
international monetary system.
The paper begins with a brief introduction and argument about the
necessity of having a flexible exchange rate regime in the modern financial world
and the positive economic attributes that define the current monetary system.
Throughout the paper I analyze the history of the international financial system in
an attempt to examine the future of the system and argue for the most adequate
monetary framework going forward. Each of the three international monetary
systems has unique strengths and weaknesses that supplement my argument
throughout the paper. The paper is split up into seven sections, including the
introduction. The second section of the paper examines the goals of the
international financial system and what is expected of an acceptable monetary
system. That section includes a discussion about all the major exchange rates
regimes throughout international financial history and examines the theory
behind the regimes.
The third section summarizes the history of the international gold
standard, highlighting it strengths, weaknesses, and eventual downfall. The
fourth section offers a description of the constant change, inflation, and war that
transpired during the gold standard inter-war years. After the gold standard the
fifth section talks about the accomplishment of international finance that was the
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Bretton-Woods System. This part examines the tumultuous creation of the
system by John Maynard Keynes and Harry Dexter White, its subsequent early
history from the time it started until it actually began to work, and its dramatic
end, characterized by the Triffen Paradox. The sixth section of this paper outlines
the current floating exchange rate system and the inherent strength in the
flexibility it has allowed the international monetary system. This part of the paper
also analyzes the strengths, drawbacks, and the future of the system. The last
and seventh section provides the conclusions of the paper and attempts to
provide evidence to support the thesis, while deciding what the future of the
international financial system might resemble.

6

Section 2: International Financial System goals and exchange rate theory
Direction/Description of the IFS
The history of the international monetary system is based on the attempts
of the more powerful and prosperous nations of the world trying to build a stable
system of trade and currency exchange, that promotes competitive equality
between international economies while trying to battle the crises and inequality
that results from the same competitiveness in the system.1 The three major
international monetary systems that have attempted to achieve this goal over the
past hundred and fifty years were the International Gold Standard, The Bretton
Woods System, and the current Managed Float System. Each of the previous
and current international monetary systems had their flaws and strengths and
served as the international monetary system for a number of years. It should be
pointed out that the basis of all international monetary development is a form of
capital or monetary instrument such as gold or the dollar. Without a form of
payment and a unit of account the international monetary system or international
trade would be a barter system economy.2
The international financial system is all the participating economies of the
world acting independently, yet bound together by the need for trade and
currency exchange. The roles of this monetary system, that links all participating
nations, is to eliminate problems that arise from the balance of payments, protect

1

Paul De Grauwe, International Money: Post War Trends and Theories( New York: Oxford University Press,
1989), 10-12.
2
Ibid., 1-3.
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nations from monetary shocks by providing international credit, and most
importantly of all, stabilize and prevent chaos in the foreign exchange
markets.3To understand international economics and finance, it is essential to
understand the development and functions of the monetary system that governs
international finance.
Goals of IFS, Fixed vs. Floating, Stability, Macro-Policy
The international financial system can be loosely defined as a common
institutional framework between the economies of the world within which
international payments are made, movements of capital are accommodated, and
exchange rate rates among different currencies are determined.4 The goals of an
international financial system are to create a stable set of rules, agreements,
functioning mechanisms and institutions to regulate exchange rates, international
payments, and capital flows. The international monetary system is always
evolving and changing to work more effectively as powerful economic nations
see fit.5
The ultimate goal is to create a permanent international monetary system
that adapts to economic conditions over time while creating a stable system of
exchange rates and capital flows that cultivate easy foreign trade and account
between all the interdependent nations of the world. This ideal international
monetary and exchange rate system has proved elusive over time and may
3

Barry Eichengreen, Globalizing Capital: A History of the International Monetary System( New Jersey:
Princeton University Press, 1998), 3.
4
Bruce G. Resnick and Cheol S. Eun, International Financial Management(New York: McGraw-Hill
Publishing, 2009), 25.
5
Ibid, Pg. 25-27.
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never actually be realized. The constant change in international finance alone
makes the development of a perfectly functioning and adjusting system
unrealistic, contributing to a debate about what monetary and exchange rate
system should be used as the international agreement.
To be effective, an international monetary system must accomplish three
goals as they pertain to international finance. An international monetary system
must have a method of determining exchange rates, an adjustment mechanism
for the current accounts balance of trade, and be stable enough to promote trade
and the movement of capital. While an international monetary arrangement has
to meet all of these goals to function, some financial systems meet certain
aspects of these goals better than others. All three international financial regimes
from history have tried to accomplish these goals in distinctly different ways,
which have created differing results, leading to debates over which system has
met these goals best.6 If a monetary system is successful in creating an effective
exchange rate determination system, trade adjustment mechanism, and
promotes trade and capital movement, there would be unfettered world economic
growth. The problem is that presently, every monetary arrangement in history
has had weaknesses in achieving at least one or more of the goals, resulting in
wide sweeping change or the threat of such change across international finance.7

6

J. Lawrence Broz and Jeffery A. Frieden, “ The Political Economy of International Monetary Relations,”
The Annual Review of Political Science Vol. 4 (June 2001): 319-321, accessed September 27, 2014,
http://scholar.harvard.edu /files/jfrieden/files/annualreview2.pdf.
7
Ibid Pg, 318-320.
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The first goal of an international monetary system is to create an effective
exchange rate system which is an establishment of price or value between two
different currencies. There have been essentially 2 different kinds of exchange
rate regimes used in the history of international economics. While there are many
exchange rate choices that face national authorities, almost all exchange rate
system are a variation of a floating or pegged system. A pegged or fixed system
was used during the gold standard and Bretton-Woods era from 1880 to 1973,
while a floating exchange rate has been used from 1973 to present. The Bretton
Woods system had a similar exchange rate system to that of the gold standard.
However Bretton Woods had a two-tier convertibility system in which the
exchange rate was determined by pegging a currency to the dollar, which was in
turned pegged to gold at a fixed price.8
A pegged currency is when a currency’s value is fixed against another
currency’s value or another measure of value. An example of this is during the
gold standard when all major currencies of the world were fixed to the value of
gold. The exchange rate would be determined by how much one currency was
worth in gold compared to another currency‘s value in gold. The exchange rate
stays fixed at a set price unless a government has to change the price because
of a problem in the central current account where there is either a constant deficit
or surplus. When the exchange rate is fixed or rigid, the exchange rate is
generally more stable because it isn’t always changing. When countries and
national businesses know that the exchange rate is going to be fixed at one

8

Alan C. Stockman, “ Choosing an Exchange Rate System.” Journal of Banking and Finance 23, No. 1
(1999): 1484-1486, accessed December 20th 2013. JSTOR Archive.
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price, there is less risk involved in doing business and losses due to exchange
rate variability.9
A floating exchange rate in general terms, is when a currency is allowed to
adjust or fluctuate against other foreign exchange currencies. Floating exchange
rates theoretically adjust automatically to equilibrium over a short period of time.
The exchange rates adjust as a function of inflation. When a country’s currency is
in surplus, it eventually becomes overvalued making buying that currency, and
goods with it, undesirable. The value of the currency starts to diminish until the
exchange rate adjusts back to equilibrium. If a currency is undervalued the
currency becomes desirable to buy cheap goods. The currency is then bought by
foreign exchange markets to obtain the cheap goods, altering the exchange rate
back to equilibrium. Arbitrage is the process of taking advantage of the price
difference between two markets. When a currency is valued low, the more
valuable currency can buy more goods and products at a cheaper price leading
to the eventual increase in value of the once low currency. Under the floating rate
system, the exchange rate is allowed to be flexible and adjust to the demand for
currency which theoretically leads back to equilibrium.
This automatic adjustability allows for governments to use monetary
policy to follow domestic agendas instead of using them to adjust to balance their
exchange rate.10 Floating exchange rates are always changing which leads to

9

Bruce G. Resnick and Cheol S. Eun, International Financial Management(New York: McGraw-Hill
Publishing, 2009), 54-56.
10
J. Lawrence Broz and Jeffery A. Frieden, “ The Political Economy of International Monetary Relations,”
Pg. 321-323.
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more risk in international business and transactions. This is because if a good,
service, or investment is expected to be bought for a low price in the future and
the exchange rate of the low price rises, the price of the good or service will also
rise. This exchange rate and price instability make it hard to predict future
investment in the international market, leading some to speculate that there is
less investment in global business under floating exchange rates.11
A comparison can be drawn between floating exchange rates and fixed
exchange rates. This also leads to the second essential goal of an international
monetary system, which is that it must be stable enough to promote trade and
the movement of capital. Floating exchange rates allow for more flexibility and
governmental control over policy, while fixed exchange rates allow for more
predictability which leads to greater stability, more global trade, investment, and
growth. Under the gold standard system and Bretton Woods, when they were
working appropriately, there was unprecedented growth and stability in
international finance. One could assume that while stable and not beleaguered
by negative shocks and fundamental flaws, fixed exchange rate systems like the
gold standard promote more trade and greater prosperity in the international
monetary system. Floating exchange rates are not as stable because of a
constantly fluctuating exchange rate that can discourage international trade,
especially in the long run. Floating exchange rates are more volatile but there are

11

Ibid Pg. 322-324.
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financial tools which have been created to mitigate the instability and risk in an
international monetary system that uses a floating exchange rate.12
These derivative instruments allow participants in the global economy to
safeguard against unstable exchange rates while national economies reap the
reward of flexibility that floating exchange rates give them. International firms can
hedge transaction exposure by using a number of different international hedging
techniques that eliminate the risk of unstable exchange rates. Some of these
hedging techniques used by international firms are the Forward Market Hedge,
the Options Market Hedge, the Money Market Hedge, lead/lag strategies, and
exposure netting.13
One hedging example a firm could use is the forward market hedge. In
this hedging position a corporation that has a foreign currency dominated
receivable, can hedge exposure by selling (buying) the foreign currency
receivable forward. Basically the firm can lock in at the forward exchange rate
hedging the risk of the volatile exchange market. The cost of this hedge is the
bank transaction fee +/- the opportunity cost. If the spot rate in the future is less
than the forward rate the firm locked into, the firm had a positive opportunity cost
while the opposite is true if the future spot rate is better than the forward rate
locked into. There are many different tools built into the financial exchange
market that negate the slightly more unstable exchange rate regime that results
from a floating system. While firms have to take a few extra steps to guard

12

J. Lawrence Broz and Jeffery A. Frieden, “ The Political Economy of International Monetary Relations,”
Pg. 321-323.
13
Bruce G. Resnick and Cheol S. Eun, International Financial Management, Pg. 194-198.
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against exchange rate instability, these derivative and hedging practices help the
international economy to mitigate risk while realizing the reward of a flexible
exchange rate system.14
Long and short term stability is an essential piece of having an effective
international monetary system. Fixed exchange rate regimes offer more stability
and growth for as long as they are able to be maintained but take away a
government’s ability to follow their own monetary goals. Floating exchange rate
regimes are more unstable, but have options built into the markets to protect
from this instability and allow governments to follow their own agenda. This
constant trade-off between the benefits of each international exchange rate
system and their respective stability is a debate that has persisted in international
finance for half a century.

Regime Current Account Mechanism
The third essential goal for an international financial system is to have an
effective adjustment mechanism for the current account balance. The inability of
an international monetary system to adjust imbalances in the current account can
lead to the failure of an international system. When nations have a deficit or
surplus in the current account, there must be a mechanism or way for the deficit
or surplus to eventually adjust back to equilibrium. The main difference between
the current floating international system and the previous two fixed regimes is

14

Bruce G. Resnick and Cheol S. Eun, International Financial Management, Pg. 194-198.
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that under the international floating system, the current account balance adjusts
automatically to correct surpluses and deficits when trade imbalances occur.15 In
fixed exchange rates systems like Bretton-Woods and the gold standard,
governments have no choice but to use monetary policy and devaluation to
correct imbalances. The floating systems automatic current account adjustment
allows governments to use monetary policy for goals other than trying to adjust
imbalances in the current account.
The current account mechanism under the gold standard utilized central
bank monetary policy to balance the current accounts and David Hume’s theory
of price specie flow. Price specie flow theory meant that when gold came into a
country it would inflate the price. This makes goods from a domestic country
expensive while foreign goods are made cheap, leading to an outflow of gold and
an adjustment back to equilibrium in the current accounts. Under the gold
standard some central banks would artificially try to maintain a positive current
account by trying to hold on to old gold assets, creating long lasting imbalances
in the current account.16
Under the Bretton-Woods system the main adjustment mechanism for the
current accounts balance was central bank’s monetary policy, borrowing assets
from the IMF and creating financial capital restrictions. Monetary policy has
difficulty correcting both internal and external imbalances alone. Many central
banks would devalue their currency to balance domestic goals and the current

15

J. Lawrence Broz and Jeffery A. Frieden, “ The Political Economy of International Monetary Relations,”
Pg. 335-337.
16
Barry Eichengreen, Globalizing Capital: A History of the International Monetary System, Pg. 25-28.
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account. Central banks would tend to use monetary policy to correct domestic
imbalances due to political pressure leading to long lasting imbalances in the
international current account. Central banks using monetary policy to follow
domestic policy left them unable to use the same monetary policy to correct
exchange rates imbalances. This led to constant deficits and surpluses,
unsettling the whole financial system, resulting in the United States dollar to be
constantly overvalued after 1971.17
Central banks have to take action and use monetary policy to maintain
balance in the current accounts under fixed exchange rate system. Under fixed
exchange rate regimes central banks have to use their monetary policy tools
such as increasing government purchases or decreasing taxes to achieve a
balance in the international current account. If the exchange rate is pegged
central banks will have to purchase or sell FX reserves. The purchasing of FX
reserves acts like either increasing government purchases or selling government
debt. Central banks, due to political pressure and other agendas however would
rather use these tools to correct domestic imbalances such as inflation or
unemployment. This handcuffed governments under the gold standard and
Bretton Woods, leading to long lasting and frequent imbalances.18
Under the current floating international monetary system, if exchange
rates are unhampered by government protection, the current account balances
automatically due to inflation. When prices rise, exports become less attractive to

17

J. Lawrence Broz and Jeffery A. Frieden, “ The Political Economy of International Monetary Relations,”
Pg. 322-325.
18
Alan C. Stockman, “ Choosing an Exchange Rate System.” Journal of Banking and Finance, Pg. 1488-1491
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other countries leading to depreciation in currency, adjusting the current account
back to equilibrium. Macro-monetary policy is not needed because theoretically
prices and the current account adjust automatically which allows monetary tools
to be used to follow domestic governmental economic goals.19 This is one reason
why, floating exchange rates are characterized as more flexible and conducive to
central bank independence.
It is important that an international monetary system meet all three goals
in order for the system to be successful. An international monetary system must
have a method of determining exchange rates, an adjustment mechanism for the
current accounts balance of trade, and be stable enough to promote trade and
the movement of capital. While each system has had some semblance of these
three characteristics, it is important to note that each system had its own
particular strengths and weaknesses in accomplishing these goals. Every past
international monetary system has had a fundamental trade off in which we have
had to take the good with the bad. While no system comes close to being perfect,
all three of the past systems accomplished the three goals of an International
Financial System for at least a period of time.

Exchange Rate Schools of Thought
One of the most important aspects of an international financial system is
its exchange rate mechanism and policy. The exchange rate is the rate at which

19

Ibid Pg. 1485-1488
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one country’s currency can be converted to another country’s currency for the
purpose of trade and international transaction. Each of the three major monetary
systems has had a unique exchange rate system based on the value of
international currency. The Gold Standard System and Bretton Woods System
were characterized by rigid or pegged exchange rate regimes while the current
monetary system has a flexible floating exchange rate regime. Throughout this
paper, there will be an examination of each of the three major financial system’s
exchange rate systems, including their strengths and weaknesses. We will
evaluate each in order to determine which, is the best option for the future.
The predominant theory of international exchange rate over the past few
decades has been the neoclassical Purchasing Power Parity model which
assumes sufficient demand and eventual returns to equilibrium. This model
assumes that the exchange rates between two nations are equal to the ratio of
the nation’s price levels. If one nation’s goods become more expensive or
cheaper, it is assumed that arbitrage will restore price equality. In the
neoclassical model trade balance influences the exchange rate and it is expected
that system will be balanced, or reach equilibrium in the long run. Capital flows
have no function in this theory.20 If the PPP theory holds true then differential
inflation between countries are offset by exchange rate changes. There is
evidence to suggest that the PPP theory doesn’t always hold true due to
fluctuating capital flows, which causes changes in the nominal exchange rate,

20

John T. Harvey, “ Post Keynesian versus Neoclassical Explanations of Exchange Rate Movements: A
Short Look at the Long Run,” Journal of Post Keynesian Economics Vol. 5 No. 2 (Winter 2005): 161-162.
Accessed October, 13th 2014. http://www.econ.tcu.edu/harvey/workppr/wp8.pdf
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also changing the real exchange rate. The real exchange rate is represented by
1+𝜋$

the formula 𝑞 = (1+𝑒)(1+𝜋£) where q is the deviation from PPP, π$ and π£ are the
inflation rates of two respective countries, and e is the rate of change. The real
exchange rate measures deviation from Purchasing Power Parity. Changes in
the real exchange rate affect the competitive position of nations in the exchange
market and country’s trade balances.21
While this paper will analyze the traditional Purchasing Power Parity
model in greater depth, there are other influential models of exchange rate
theory. The Neoclassical monetary model used by monetarists, takes into
account Purchasing Power Parity while adding domestic modeling, possibly
making it a more complete model.22 The equation of exchange used in this model
is the quantity theory of money or P=MV/y where P is the price, M is the money
supply, V is the velocity of money, and y is real output.23 It is assumed that real
output is analogous to the natural rate of growth and constant in the long run. In
this approach the three factors that determine exchange rate are the relative
money supply, the relative velocity of the money supply, and relative national
outputs. If all is held equal, an increase in the money supply of a nation will result
in an equal depreciation against other currencies. An increase in the velocity of a
currency has the same result as an increase in the supply. The monetarist model
assumes that prices adjust fully and completely to equilibrium in the long run.24

21

Bruce G. Resnick and Cheol S. Eun, International Financial Management, 144-145.
Ibid Pg. 166-167.
23 23
Bruce G. Resnick and Cheol S. Eun, International Financial Management, Pg. 164
24
Bruce G. Resnick and Cheol S. Eun, International Financial Management, Pg. 164
22
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There are many different competing theories of exchange rate that have
been created to forward the beliefs of the many differing economic schools of
thought. Each school analyzes exchange rates differently, putting emphasis on
different factors that drive exchange rates. While the Neoclassical model and
Monetarist model are similar, the Post Keynesian model, which is mentioned
later in this section, focuses on the capital flows that PPP theory ignores. Going
forward in this paper, we will analyze exchange rates through the mainstream
neoclassical model.
Gold Standard Exchange Rate Theory
The gold standard exchange rate system was a rigid system based on any
two countries’ currencies in relation to the price that each currency would
command in terms of gold. The prominent characteristic of the gold system was
that each participating country in the system guaranteed the free convertibility of
its money into gold at a certain fixed price. 25 The exchange rate is determined by
their gold content and what one currency is valued at in relation to gold at a
pegged price compared to the another economy’s currency.
Basically people of the major participating countries were able to use their
currency based on its convertibility to the price of gold to buy assets or currency
of a foreign country. Under the international gold standard essentially every
currency was an international currency and could be used in the international
economy. If the British pound was worth 1 gram of gold and one unit of the

25

John Charles Pool, and Steve Stamos, The ABCs of International Finance( Lexington: D.C Heath and
Company, 1987), 50-52.
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French franc was worth ½ a gram of gold, the pound would be worth twice as
much as the franc. This means that one could convert the pound directly into
French francs without having to actually buy gold and sell it, based on the price
of gold.26 In the gold standard, any disequilibrium in the exchange rate would be
corrected by cross border flows of gold. Balance of Payments are also corrected
automatically under the gold standard.
Bretton-Woods Two Tier Exchange Rate
The Bretton Woods system was described as a gold-exchange standard.
The United State dollar became the international reserve currency, as it was the
only currency directly convertible to gold. Nations held both gold and American
dollars. Countries could convert their currency to U.S dollars which were backed
and fully convertible to gold. The dollar was pegged to gold at 35 dollars per
ounce.
The Bretton Woods international financial system was quite similar to the
previous major financial system, the gold standard, but there were a few major
differences. The major difference between the two was the choice of assets in
which national currencies could be convertible. The United States guaranteed the
convertibility of gold into the U.S dollar at a fixed price of 35 dollars per ounce of
gold.27 This convertibility rate was only held to foreign central banks, unlike the
gold standard system, and a second private gold market was created with no
assurance that the price of gold would be held at a constant rate. The second tier

26
27

Paul De Grauwe, International Money: Post War Trends and Theories, 10-13.
Paul De Grauwe, International Money: Post War Trends and Theories,15-20.
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of the Bretton Woods financial strategy was that foreign countries participating in
the system would convert their currency into dollars at a fixed price or the
exchange rate. The exchange rate was supposed to remain fixed except when
the official exchange rate was out of equilibrium, which was when it was
determined a currency was either over appreciated or under appreciated.28In the
case of prolonged disequilibrium, fixed exchange rates were allowed to be
adjustable within a two percent band to compensate for over or under
appreciation.
There were several reasons why the convertibility system was so complex
in the Bretton Woods System and that a return to the gold standard would have
been extremely difficult. The first problem was that the distribution of gold across
the countries participating in the system was very uneven. The United States
owned almost 70 percent of all the gold in the system and creditable gold
conversion to other currencies would have required a massive shift in gold. 29
Another problem was the belief that the existing amount of gold was not enough
to keep up with the growing demand for international liquidity. The fact that only
one currency was set to gold and then the other currency set to the original
currency, the dollar, would decrease the amount of gold used in the international
Bretton Woods system but put more pressure on dollar eventually leading to lack
of faith and crisis.30
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The Bretton Woods system differed from the gold standard system not just
in its complex convertibility system, but in a number of other different major
tendencies as well. One of the these major differences was the change from
normal pegged exchange rates to more adjustable pegged exchange rates which
were subjected to what is known as fundamental disequilibrium. There was no
automatic adjustment system for the current account or exchange rates, which
forced governments to use monetary policy to correct imbalance. Another major
change that was not as heralded as the more adjustable exchange rates, were
controls that were instituted to limit international capital flows from country to
country. These controls were implemented to avoid the threat posed by the
unpredictable capital flows that plagued the interwar period.31
Floating Exchange Rate Theory
The current floating exchange system is very different from its two
predecessors and the most adaptable of all the exchange rates regimes. The
floating exchange rate system has been the dominant exchange rate system for
the last 30 years and this paper’s analysis seeks to argue is the most adequate
exchange rate regime for the future. The floating exchange rate is not fixed like
the other two monetary systems before it, making it adaptable to changes in the
monetary system. This gives governments the freedom to pursue their monetary
objectives without causing the mass overhaul of the monetary system.
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The current international monetary system allows for flexibility in
governmental action because a flexible exchange rate is supposed to correct the
balance of payments, allowing the central banks to pursue economic goals it
chooses through fiscal and monetary policy.32 If a country’s currency is overvalued, then it will depreciate against other currencies without central banks
having to make adjustments, and if the currency is overvalued, it will
automatically appreciate against other currencies. The system is held in place by
arbitrage and the major aspect of the determination of a country’s exchange rate
is inflation. In this current system exchange rates are driven by interest rates
which in turn are driven by inflation or if a country’s money is over or
undervalued.33It must be noted however that it in today’s global economy
variables change fast, making it difficult to determine if a currency is over-valued
or under-valued. The system also does not always adjust instantly as it does in
theory.
Interest Rate Parity, the International Fisher effect and the theory of
Purchasing Power Parity explains the over and under valuation of currency. High
inflation rates in a country lead to high interest rate in that country. High interest
rates in a country lead to the flow of foreign currency to that country depreciating
the currency, returning it eventually, in theory, back to equilibrium with the foreign
currency. The managed floating exchange system is very unstable and goes
through cycles, and central banks often participate in the market to influence
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exchange rates.34 There is some question and mixed results about whether
Purchasing Power Parity and the International Fisher effect always lead to
balance of payments equilibrium in a timely manner. There have been many
cases where countries either maintain prolonged deficits and or prolonged
advantages in the balance of payments.35
Interest Rate Parity theory is what drives the complex balance of payments
equilibrium system in the floating exchange rate system. According to the Interest
Rate Parity or (IRP theory), interest rates differentially determine the forward
premium/ discount rate, and the currency of a country with relatively high interest
rates, will depreciate against a country with relatively low interest rates, even
though that is not always the case. Interest Rate Parity is an arbitrage condition
that must hold when international markets are in equilibrium, meaning that all
markets adjust until returns from investing in the foreign market equal domestic
1+𝑖

return. This can be shown in an equation as 𝐹 = 𝑆 { 1+𝑖$}, where F is the forward
𝑙

rate, S is the spot rate, 𝑖$ is the interest rate of one nation, and 𝑖𝑙 is the interest of
a second nation.36
The equilibrium between the foreign exchange markets is because of
Covered Arbitrage Interest or CIA. Arbitrageurs try to make a profit by investing
money and using the forward and spot rates to take advantage of countries with
higher interest rates . The profits made by arbitrageurs keep the markets in
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equilibrium because the flow of money from the US to a foreign country causes
US Interest rates to increase and the foreign interest rate to decrease. The CIA
and flow of money also would cause the spot rate of the nation with the lower
interest rate to decrease against the country with the lower interest rate. The
opposite would be true of the forward rate because the money flow would cause
the lower interest rate nation’s forward rate to increase while the high interest’s
rate nation’s forward rate would depreciate against the lower interest rate
country. This promises that exchange rates reach equilibrium defined as IRP,
across all markets, currencies, and interest rates.37
CIA causes the forward and spot rate differential to equal the interest
differential. This means that because the equation

1±𝑖𝐹
1±𝑖𝑢𝑠

=

𝐹
𝑆

, the forward

premium/discount rate is determined by interest rate differentials. The Interest
Rate Parity relationship can be approximated as 𝐸 = 𝑖𝑓 − 𝑖𝑢𝑠 where E is the
exchange rate, 𝑖𝑓 is the interest rate of one nation, and 𝑖𝑢𝑠 is the interest rate of
a second nation. Changes in the spot rate are determined by the interest rate
differential.38
Due to capital flows and the assumption of perfect capital mobility, interest
rates not only determine the forward and spot rates but also drive exchange rates
in the short run because the exchange rate depends on the relative interest rates
between two countries and the expected future exchange rate.39 In the end,
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Interest Rate Parity determines that the currency with the high interest rate is
expected to depreciate against the low interest rates nation as a result of covered
interest arbitrage. Data shows that this does not always hold true and that often
the higher interest rate nation’s currency will continue to appreciate against the
lower interest nation. This is the opposite result of the IRP relationship making
the forward rate actually a poor predictor of the spot rate.40 This anomaly in the
IRP relationship is also known as the forward premium puzzle.
The question is why the high interest rate nation’s currency would depreciate.
The high interest rate currency experiences depreciation to the country with the
lower interest rate because of the relationship between the Interest Rate Parity,
the International Fisher effect and the Purchasing Power Parity. Purchasing
Power Parity tells us that the exchange rate between two nations should be
equal to the ratio of their price levels. PPP comes from the law of one price
applied internationally to a standard commodity of one basket.41 The relative
version of the PPP states that the rate of change in the exchange rate should be
equal to the inflation rate differential between nations. PPP explains that a
nation’s goods are either undervalued or overvalued in relation to another
country’s goods, increasing exports or imports depending on the desire for
imports of an undervalued good until that good is in equilibrium.42
Relative PPP tells us that the percent change in the spot rate is determined
by inflation differentials between countries. Eventually relative PPP comes to the
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simplified conclusion that 𝑖𝑓 − 𝜋𝑓 = 𝑖𝑑 − 𝜋𝑑, which means the foreign interest
rate minus foreign inflation equals the domestic interest rate minus domestic
inflation. Now we have to take the International Fisher Effect into mind. The
Fisher Effect holds that an increase or decrease in the expected inflation rate of a
country will cause an equal increase or decrease in the interest rate of a country
or 𝑖 = 𝑟 + 𝜋 where 𝑖 = inflation, 𝑟 = interest rate, and 𝜋 =echange rate.43
The International Fisher Effect says that the nominal interest rate differential
reflects expected change in exchange rate. If we tie the International Fisher
Effect with IRP and relative PPP, we can began to see what causes a
depreciation of a country’s currency with a relative high interest rate compared to
a country’s currency with a relatively low interest rate.44 If we tie all three together
and change the Fisher equation to 𝑟 = 𝑖 − 𝜋, then the simplified PPP equation
becomes𝑟𝑓 = 𝑟𝑑. This shows us that real interest rates of return are equal
across countries and currencies, and that countries with higher inflation rates
have higher nominal interest rates. A foreign interest rate is higher because the
country’s foreign inflation rate is higher.45 If a country’s goods are more
expensive, they will have a higher exchange rate due to their higher price of
currency. The country’s currency would then be expected to depreciate against
countries that have a low inflation rate and subsequently low exchange rate.
This means that Inflation is the underlying cause of why a country’s currency
that has a high interest rate depreciates. High inflation causes higher interest

43

Bruce G. Resnick and Cheol S. Eun, International Financial Management, 142-143.
Ibid, 148-149.
45
Ibid, 149-151
44

28

rates in the high interest rate country or 𝑖𝑓 > 𝑖𝑑 because 𝜋𝑓 > 𝜋𝑑 where 𝑓 =
inflation and 𝑑 = interest rate depreciation. IRP holds that the forward premium
/discount rate should be equal to the interest rate differential. The forward
premium/ discount rate is determined by interest rate differentials which are
determined by the country’s expected inflation rate. More money and capital
flowing into the country because of greater interest rates means that the value of
money in the high interest rate nation will decrease or depreciate against the
United States because of an increase of the value of money as funds flow to the
foreign country.46
Eventually if the IRP theory is right then exchange rates should return to
equilibrium. IRP holds that exchange rates depend on the interest rate and
forward rates between the two nations, so inflation also the determines exchange
rates. Simplified, inflation causes higher interest rates causing an increase in the
spot rate and a decrease in the forward rate of a country.47 A decrease in the
forward rate of the country leads us to believe that the strength of the dollar
should increase and the foreign country’s currency should decrease. The
exchange rates should creep toward equilibrium if IRP theory holds true. As
stated earlier, this is not always the case and the stronger currency often
continues to appreciate resulting in the forward premium puzzle. To conclude in
combining IRP, Relative PPP, and IFE theory suggests the high interest rate
country’s currency will depreciate because it has higher inflation.48
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The Post Keynesians offer a different exchange rate model that focuses on
capital flow and the fact that the PPP theory often doesn’t hold true in the short
and medium run, leading to periods of both over and under currency valuation.
Post Keynesians, while having a tendency to examine the short run of exchange
rate theory, believe that prices do not adjust automatically in long run and that
portfolio capital flows are what drive exchange rates. The Post Keynesian’s
believe exchange rates are influenced by many factors. These factors include
interest rates, macroeconomic growth and stability, inflation, and band wagon
effects.49 Instead of focusing on just inflation, arbitrage, and the money supply,
Keynesians look at the role of capital markets, investor psychology, and financial
variables that affect actions of market participants. All of these things can affect
capital markets and flows, altering and driving exchange rates. Keynesian’s tend
to examine the short run because these many factors change in the short run,
altering the long run.50 The exchange rate is believed to be influenced by more
than just price and arbitrage with most other factors held constant. While
Purchasing Power Parity may have described long term exchange rates under
rigid regimes, it does not hold true under flexible exchange rates which can be
altered by many factors, in particular capital flows.
The flexible exchange rate that is a major aspect of the present international
monetary floating exchange system is strong because it is adaptable, allowing
governments to pursue their own economic agenda. The exchange rate also
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achieves balance automatically over the long run as long as the rates are
allowed to be determined by the market. The drawback back of the floating
exchange rate is short term uncertainty adversely affects international trade and
investment with companies not wanting to lose capital due to an unstable
fluctuating exchange rate.
It should be noted that while the majority of economic powers use a
version of the free floating exchange rate system, there are still nations that do
not have their own currency or follow a different exchange rate policy around the
world. The most prevalent of these exchange rate arrangements are the crawling
peg, currency board, crawling bands and or conventional fixed pegged
arrangements.51 While most major economies are an independent float, countries
that want more short term stability, have weak or no existent currencies, or want
to control their currency follow a broad spectrum of pegged and controlled
floating exchange rate systems. An example of this is China which uses a
crawling peg to adjust rates by a small and fixed amount as they see fit.52 Many
other currencies peg their currency to other major currencies like the dollar, or
even use a strong currency as the legal tender of their own country. It can be
more advantageous for weaker economies to peg their currency to strong onwa
rather than face the pressure that come from powerful economies and more
valuable currencies in the free float.
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The exchange rate is one of, if not, the key aspect when choosing an
appropriate international financial system for the future. The only exchange rate
that works in the real world is a flexible exchange rate system where countries
are free to explore the monetary measures they want to use in their nation’s best
interest. While all of the known exchange rate regimes have their drawbacks, a
flexible exchange rate system allows for stability in the long run, even though it
may compromise some global trade and transaction in the short run because
exchange rates are not guaranteed.

32

Section 3: The International Gold Standard
Bimetallism and Early Gold Standard
The most appropriate way to critically examine the international monetary
system is by analyzing the economic history of the three previous prevalent
international monetary systems. The analysis of the economic history of the
international monetary system provides us with the context to explain the current
floating exchange system and subsequently the future of the current international
finance system.53 The comprehensive examination of the economic history of the
international monetary system proves that the dollar based floating exchange
system will remain the dominant international financial system for the predictable
future, despite the recent global financial crisis and economists who have
recently theorized otherwise.
The oldest predecessor of the current managed float system and first real
international financial system was the international gold standard monetary
system. The second longest lasting of the systems, the gold standard can be
traced back to the mid- eighteenth century until the international monetary
systems initial change from the gold standard in 1914.
Before the international gold system really became the dominant
international monetary system that some scholars are nostalgic about today,
most countries including England were on a bimetallic standard that was based
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on silver.54Silver was the dominant metal form of species in the Middle Ages up
to the eighteenth century because other metals were either too heavy or in the
case of gold, much too light. Gold, despite being light, started to be used as
currency throughout some of Western Europe and eventually a mix of gold,
silver, and copper were used in international transactions. The standard of
Bimetallism despite its inefficiency in balancing international debts was used by
most of the world until the late 1800s.55
This system of Bimetallism was flawed because the ratio used to calculate
value between gold and silver needed to adjust between devaluations and
appreciations of both metals, but legislation used fixed prices and ratios that
were not allowed to adjust. This leads to Gresham’s law which maintains that
when countries overvalue one money and undervalue another, the undervalued
currency will leave the country while the overvalued currency will flow in. 56
Basically when countries used fixed ratios or price controls, currency will flow to a
market where it is highly valued.
This policy of overvaluing and undervaluing different monies used in the
system of bimetallism gave rise to the gold standard in Great Britain in the early
1700’s when Sir Isaac Newton, who was head of the mint, undervalued gold
compared to silver, inadvertently facilitating the exit of silver from Great Britain.
This gave rise to the Gold Standard because gold was the viable currency left
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without a reserve of Silver.57 Great Britain became the dominant financial world
power in the 18th and 19th centuries propelled by the industrial revolution.
Rationally other world powers who were major trade partners of Britain began to
convert to more of a gold standard to make trade and the balancing of debts
easier. Nations held to a bimetallism standard still, but the difference in values
caused problems and threatened to flood countries such as France with foreign
currencies that were more highly valued than their own. This led to the Latin
Monetary Union between France, Italy, Switzerland, and Belgium to keep their
silver on the same constantly maintained level.58
The Franco Prussian war however lead to further instability and Great
Britain further became a symbol of monetary power and stability under the gold
standard. Germany then adopted the gold standard because of its trade
advantages and Great Britain’s rapid growth leading to the other major powers to
fall into the gold standard like a domino effect. The major countries of the world
followed, not wanting to have a bimetallism standard fluctuate against, the world
and most importantly Great Britain’s Gold standard.59 This is just one example of
many where the dominant world financial power influences the creation of a
world monetary system to its advantage.
While some countries lobbied for a return to silver, Great Britain, the major
international power, dealt in gold and was committed to a gold system despite
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evidence of the inflationary and deflationary problems that it might cause.60Great
Britain’s world monetary dominance lead to the rise of the gold standard, which
was the system that Britain preferred despite any flaws inherent in it, leading the
rest of the world follow. It is impossible not to draw comparisons to the United’s
States hand in the creation of the Bretton- Woods monetary system after it
became the major monetary power in the world surpassing Great Britain.

Gold Standard Golden Age and Decline
The year 1880 marks the beginning of the golden age of the gold standard
international monetary system. By this time most of the world was operating on
some form of a gold standard. England, the United States, Germany, and France
had the closest thing to a hundred percent gold standard where gold coins were
the dominant currency and all the rest of the currency circulating such as silver
and paper had additional reserves of gold backing it.61 Most of the rest of the
major economic powers of the world took part in the gold standard monetary
system by being ready to convert their monies to gold at a fixed rate on demand.
The center of the gold standard international monetary system was in London
and a key assumption of the gold standard was that all the governments within
the system maintain the convertibility of their currency to gold.62
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Probably one of the most accepted and long lasting theories explaining
the gold standard is David Hume’s price-specie flow model. This model explains
the gold standard through the balance of payments and the effected
corresponding prices and flow of money from country to country, correcting trade
imbalances.63 The entrepreneur exporting gold received payment in gold which
was then turned to coin and acceptable money. It is assumed that the
entrepreneur importing a trade item paid with exported gold. Countries with trade
deficits under the gold standard imported more than they exported which means
gold was flowing out of the country to the nations that were exporting the goods.
This creates a self-correcting trade imbalance. With less gold in the importing
country, available prices fall in the country with the deficit. With more money or
gold flowing into the country, exported goods prices began to rise. With imported
goods becoming more expensive, people in the country with the trade deficit
reduce their buying. The countries with the rising prices, which originally had a
trade surplus with the importing country, begin to import more goods themselves.
The country who was in deficit is therefore importing less and exporting more,
correcting the trade imbalance back to equilibrium. Hume’s model does not take
into account the effect of banks and assumes there is only gold money.64
Awhile after Hume’s theory a group from Britain known as the Cunliffe
Committee further elaborated Hume’s model adding the actions of central banks
and other forms or currency such as paper. The Cunliffe elaboration added to
and included the major role of central banks to Hume’s theory but still
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underestimated the grand scale of transactions of gold that would come to
characterize the late period of the gold standard system.65
Central banks had a number of tools at their disposal to affect their
countries policies and the balance of payments equilibrium. The central banks
could lend or advance money in what was called discounting a bill which was
subject to a discounted interest rate.66 By raising or decreasing the discount
interest rate, making it cheaper or more expensive, the central bank could control
the number of people using the advance for money and effectively the amount of
credit being used in the country. This subsequently affected the ability to restore
the balance of payments of the nation through credit or advances loaned out.67
Central banks of countries with high prices could anticipate gold losses
and raise its discount interest rate which would reduce the amount of lending and
advances. With less money being lent out, there was a decrease of cash
available in the market, constricting the money supply and balancing payments
without the process of gold flowing from importers to exporters. The central
banks by this logic could then control fairly or unfairly the balance of payments by
keeping themselves at equilibrium or additionally below or above equilibrium to
maintain an advantage.68
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With the study of the gold standard there came a popular phrase or notion
coined by John Maynard Keynes known as “the rules of the game”. Many
scholars believe that the gold standard system was maintained because of all the
participating countries played by these “rules of the game”.69 The main rule of the
game was that central banks were supposed to change the discount rate to
speed up and adjust the balance of payments. The goal of this and of the central
banks was to maintain the convertibility of gold at a fixed rate. Following the
“rules of the game” and properly adjusting discount rates supported and
maintained the gold standard which was the purpose of England’s, if not all
central banks.70
There has been much speculation over the past decade if the “rules of the
game” were really followed or if, as some influential economists suggest, it was
an exaggeration made after the actual gold standard golden age, that doesn’t
particularly hold true. The major consensus among economist is that the rules of
the game were constantly violated except in the case of England and to an extent
France.71 Economist’s like Barry Eichengreen, Michael D.Bordo, and Michael B.
Connolly, who have written in depth on the issue, all cite and relate to the study
carried out by Arthur Bloomfield in 1959 which contends; with the exception of a
few countries, the “rules of the game were frequently violated, meaning that
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discount rates were not always changed in the required direction, and that a
number of countries used practices to prevent gold from leaving.72
While it is true that not all countries played by the rules of the game during
the golden age of the gold standard, it is true that none of the major economic
powers central banks broke the rules to the extent that it challenged the overall
objective of the system, which was the maintained pegged convertibility of gold.
Scholars who advocate for a return to the gold standard almost see the gold
standard system as an entire world system that ran without any problems with all
countries having the same goal during that period.73 These are the same
scholars who contend a return to a form of the gold standard is the best option
for the international monetary system moving forward in the present day. This
assumption of a single entity of the gold standard running smoothly is flawed, as
Bloomfield showed in his 1959 study. The nations under the gold standard were
all acting in their own best interest, or what the central banks believed was their
own best interest at the time.
The gold standard did not run smoothly outside of the major European
financial powers and the “rules of the game” were not always followed. The major
financial powers of the day maintained the gold standard system and loosely yet
unknowingly followed this “set of rules” because during the time of prosperity that
characterized the golden age of the gold standard. It was in those individual

72
73

Arthur I. Bloomfield, Monetary Policy Under The International Gold Standard: 1880-1914, 50-51.
Barry Eichengreen, Globalizing Capital: A History of the International Monetary System, 30-31.

40

nations best interest to follow the dominant power of the time, Great Britain, and
maintain the gold standard system which relied on gold convertibility.74
The system was maintained because it was in the best interest of the
powers of the world to maintain the gold standard even if it wasn’t followed to an
exact degree of comprehension by all nations participating. England, with its
currency being protected by the gold standard, and the advantage of having the
sterling as the reserve currency, had no reason to not follow the “golden rules” of
the gold standard. Most other countries loosely adhered to the rules because of
England’s financial dominance and fear of policies by England hurting their
interests if “the rules” weren’t followed. Many developing countries would not be
able to maintain gold reserves without the pegged London Gold exchange. 75
The Gold Standard led the world or international economy into a period of
unprecedented growth and free trade that lasted from the 1880’s to 1914. 76 The
strength of the gold standard was that it assured long term price stability which
led to an opening of free trade in the world. The main criticism of the gold
standard is that in the short run, the system was very prone to real and monetary
shocks making the prices of gold in the short term very unstable and
unpredictable. Another criticism of the gold standard system is that central
government can do very little to protect from these shocks, and it is incredibly
expensive to produce a real gold coin standard.77
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The decline of the golden age of the gold standard started in the early
1900s. The growth of political and military pressures by dominant and periphery
countries started to challenge the system. The political and international
monetary goals of the countries on the gold standard started to change and
would have provided a challenge to the system if not for the rise of the First
World War.78
In the end, the demise from the gold standard came from the high inflation
rates caused from war, in particular World War One. Pressure to finance war
production or activities was incredibly high, resulting in the fact that governments
eventually financed military expenditures by issuing fiat currency. Eventually the
amount of money produced greatly exceeds the amount of gold a country has in
supply, and the confidence in the ability of that country to back up their money
with gold is shaken, causing people to cash in their money in for gold, further
running down the gold supply.79 When war would lead to this inflationary
confidence problem, countries would close or effectively stall the international
monetary system. When the main countries who took part in the gold standard
international system went off the gold standard in response to the first World
War, inflation in these countries increased sharply. 80
The gold standard international system that was characterized by a fixed
exchange rate system was not abandoned suddenly with the start of the
cataclysm that was the First World War. While the gold standard that existed
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from 1880 to 1914 would never again operate as an international money system
as it did during those of its golden age, a form of the system would be carried on
throughout the inter-war period with many attempts to create a new international
monetary gold standard system.81
Transition from one international monetary system to another is not
something that comes about with one major world event but through years of trial
and error which is characterized by the borrowing of traits from the old
international monetary systems into the new. The gold standard system
throughout the interwar periods of international instability was constantly in the
process of being reworked as a system, and it took many years of transition
before the next real international monetary system took hold.82 Those scholars
who recently expected the sudden decline and fall of the current managed float
monetary system in the wake of the 2008 global financial crisis were greatly
mistaken. It takes many years of transition, negotiation, study, and agreement
before a new international monetary system can be instituted, and even after this
time, as history demonstrates, it takes many years before the system really goes
into effect as intended.83
Every nation wants the international monetary system to work to their
respective country’s advantage which gridlocks the process of creating a new
international monetary system. Great Britain was the preeminent world power
during the gold standard and it was in their best interest to maintain the gold
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standard as it benefited them. Eventually after the inflation and external shocks
of World War One, the sterling lost its reputation and the protection the gold
standard had once offered it. A new economic power would arise to replace both
Great Britain and the gold standard. Only when the most dominant and elite
country both economically and militarily wants to undertake a change will there
be any chance in changing the international monetary system. Nationalism is the
main and constant force that prevents a dynamic international monetary system.
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Section 4: The Inter-war period Gold Standard
Inflation and World War One
The unstable time between the decline of the classical gold standard and
the rise of the Bretton Woods system is often referred to as the interwar period.
This period was characterized by global economic instability and failed attempts
to return to the classical gold standard after it was abandoned in the wake of
World War One.84 In late 1914 major powers like Great Britain, Germany, France,
and Russia enacted embargos on the export of gold and stopped the redemption
of banknotes for the metal. The main assumption that was maintained under the
classical gold standard, which was each country’s willingness to covert paper
and other currency to gold at a fixed rate, was utterly abandoned as gold became
an integral part in the wartime nations being able to purchase the merchandise of
warfare that was necessary.85
The stoppage of convertibility of currency to gold, by most countries in the
beginning of 1914, led to a limited floating exchange rate during the First World
War period, until 1925 when Britain resumed the Gold Standard. The rates were
limited because of lack of any foreign exchange of money. Nations created new
taxes and war bonds to fund their war efforts and eventually printed money to
fund the war that was not actually backed by gold. Each country printed different
amounts of fiat that was not backed by gold which would lead to problems after
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the war and caused the exchange rates between different countries to be vastly
different, covering a wide range.86 The drastic printing of fiat to finance the war,
led to hyper-inflation in many countries, such as the classic example in Germany.
The United States supported France and the aging dominant world power
that was Great Britain during the war allowing them to artificially depreciate their
currency against the dollar.87 This period can be seen as a transition on the world
stage as the previous dominant Great Britain was starting to give way to the
emerging economy of the United States, which would essentially create the next
international monetary system after the Second World War. This transition
probably would have been expedited if not for the global economic crash that
was the Great Depression. The United States would withdraw its currency
support of the European economic powers after the war, leaving them to the
widespread gold losses incurred from the war. Instead of attempting to maintain
the greatly inflated and overvalued pound, Great Britain abandoned its pledge of
convertibility to gold. The dollar was the only major currency to retain
commitment to the convertibility of gold after the war.88
Directly after the war almost all countries were on a managed float
system which was characterized by great diversity between exchange rates. Both
proponents and critics of the floating exchange system use the first few years of
the 1920’s and the floating exchange system that was shortly the predominant
international monetary system as evidence in cases for and against the system.
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The very influential Milton Friedman was of the opinion that many negative
reviews of the floating exchange based on its volatility and instability were off
base and unfounded.89 The political and economic instability that hampered the
floating exchange system would have also had a harmful effect on the pegged
gold standard system because of the inherent instability of the era.90
Crisis and the Great Depression
Trying to eventually convert back to the gold standard in the late 1920’s
was not the cure that many economists thought it would be, and the political
turmoil and capital flow problems that were prevalent during the brief floating
exchange rate system in the 1920’s were just as pervasive and problematic when
a new pegged gold standard was created. As the 1920’s progressed, countries
began to try and restore the gold standard system back to its golden age
dominance.91
In 1925 Great Britain went back on the gold standard and lifted its
embargo on the export of gold. The gold standard exchange rate between Britain
and the United States returned to what it was before World War One, at 4.86
dollars to 1.0 pound.92The exchange rates may have drastically overvalued the
British sterling which laid some of the seeds of the demise of the renewed gold
standard. In addition to this, the French franc, which also returned to the system,
was drastically undervalued, giving the French an unfair advantage, skewing the
89
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balance of payments, leading into a massive flow of gold into the central bank of
France.93 France then kept its currency low maintaining its competitive
advantage against the dollar and the British Sterling in policies that would not be
considered as playing by the “rules of the game” which characterized the first
classical gold standard period. France then proceeded to convert its foreign
exchanges into gold in the late 1920s.94
This put great pressure on the Bank of England which as stated earlier
served as the major world gold exchange and guarantee of convertibility to gold.
Despite these pressures, the return of the world to the gold standard and stability
briefly provided relief and recovery to the world which was still economically
recovering from the First World War. This stability would not last as pressures
continued to increase on the Bank of England with gold flowing out of England to
France and Germany. The United States central bank which held the most gold
in the world was reluctant to help because of a boon in the stock markets, and
country in general, that threatened to exceed the established ratio of gold
reserves to money.95 The Federal Reserve refused to bring down its interest
rates and let gold flow to other countries; which both hindered the expansion of
the United States domestic economy and put great pressure on countries like
Britain that were running a constant Balance of Payment deficit.96
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Countries running theses deficits had to respond by raising their discount
rates to counter the constant loss of gold that was rapidly leaking from their
countries to more attractive nations. The new interwar international gold system
was broken. Throughout the late 1920s, countries like the United States and
Germany ran a constant balance of payments and gold surplus year after year,
while countries like England ran a constant deficit.97
The species flow model of the gold standard, where the constant
adjustment of discount rates restored the balance of payments, was not working
correctly under the new international gold standard. Nations running a deficit
constantly did so and did not have gold flowing in return in order to create
balance of payments neutrality. In the United States prices never increased
because they were exporting or lending the currency and gold coming into
America, back to countries who were hit hard by the World War One. The United
States kept exporting at a constantly high rate and their prices in turn did not rise
as they should have.98 They were exporting many goods and services but the
price of the dollar didn’t increase, creating a constant surplus.
America increased the interest rates during 1920’s stock market boom to
contend with the gold to currency ratio. This made foreign lending less attractive
and brought a stop to massive amounts of foreign lending coming from the
United States. Without constant lending there was less demand for US exports.
This resulted in a fall in the price of goods that foreign countries produced,
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correcting the Balance of Payments imbalance, allowing for the new 1920s gold
standard to actually operate as it should. The issue righting the Balance of
Payments however would become insignificant with the start of the Great
Depression. The Great Depression would be the demise of the new 1920’s
interwar gold standard international monetary system.99

Decline and Transition
The demise started with the less important countries that were not
international powers. The worst global crisis in history sent the international
financial system into shock causing great damage. The capital and commodity
shocks that plagued ill-prepared developing nations left developing countries with
the choice of abandoning convertibility of their currency to gold or defaulting on
their foreign debt. In 1929 and 1930 most developing countries chose to abandon
convertibility to gold and let their currencies depreciate.100 Countries like Canada,
Argentina, and Brazil suspended the gold standard at the start of the Great
Depression. External shocks from the slumping world economy led to the weaker
economies having to choose between protecting their national banking systems
and protecting the gold standard. Nations will do what is best for their economy
and ignore what is best for the world, taking a nationalist view to the international
financial economy.

99

Ibid., 71-72.
Barry Eichengreen and Peter Temin, “The Gold Standard and the Great Depression.”Contemporary
European History vol. 9, No. 2(2000), 188-190.
100

50

Nations such as Austria, which was one of the first affected by external
shocks and a weakening of their national banks, are a great example of doing
what is best for one’s individual country. Austria, when faced with the choice of
protecting the gold standard or protecting their national banks, conceded to the
rational choice and protected their banks, abandoning convertibility to the gold
standard.101 When depositors and creditors lose faith in the capital reserves of a
country, a rapid exodus of gold and confidence from that country lead to the
abandoning of the gold standard. Germany, the most industrial country in Europe
would soon fall to the same fate as Austria. Germany, who earlier had the fourth
highest gold to currency ratio, lost 10 percent of its gold ratio in a year. Germany
was denied a loan and a respite on World War 1 reparations leading to them also
abandoning the gold standard.102
A sterling crisis in Great Britain during the early 1930s would lead to the
beginning of the end to the interwar gold standard monetary system. The bank of
England, since the return to the gold standard in 1925, suffered constant balance
of payments deficits. When the Great Depression started, countries all but
ceased trade and imposed tariffs to protect national products. The trade
imbalance of Great Britain’s central bank continued to grow causing gold to leave
the country at a rapid pace and eventually in late 1930 there was not enough
gold in England to facilitate appropriate conversion to the Sterling. At the time,
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the United States and France had to support the sterling to prevent an all-out
crisis, and the Sterling recovered slightly in 1931.103
During this time the dollar was beginning take the place of the pound as
the most important world currency and would eventually succeed the pound as
the second international reserve currency. An international reserve currency is
forged over a long period of time by the direction and will of the World’s major
economic powers. Recent history has shown that the international currency is the
money of the world’s preeminent political, military, and economic power. This has
been true of the last and only two international currency regimes, the pound and
the dollar. An international reserve currency is really whatever money the
majority of international transactions are completed or settled with. The first and
longest reigning international money was gold. Even when the pound and dollar
became the prominent international money, they were backed or supported by
gold until 1972. Most transactions were settled in exchange of gold since the
advent of central banks and the gold standard in the mid-1800.104
The Bank of England was among the first and the strongest making the
United Kingdom the hegemonic economic power of the time. The United
Kingdom was politically and economically the strongest nation of the world
making the sterling the safest, most available, and most stable currency to settle
international transactions. Eventually the small island nation would politically and
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economically take a back seat to the United States as it steadily grew into its
superpower role.105
World War One and inflation left the sterling pound weak while the war
had cemented the United States as the world’s leading nation. While the gold
standard and the pound continued to flounder during the interwar period, the
dollar’s might continued to grow. By the end of the Second World War the dollar
had cemented its place as the international reserve currency because it was the
safest, most available, and most stable currency. 106 The world’s dominant
economic power can provide the most stable and available currency which
makes their currency the most sought after to settle international transactions. An
international currency does not decline rapidly to be succeeded by a new
stronger international currency, rather it steadily loses its place as its nation
steadily loses its place as the world’s dominant power and economy. Whatever
nation is the consensus world power will have the advantage of having the
consensus international currency, using its economic dominance to establish its
legitimacy as world money.
High interest rates, a budget deficit, an unemployment rate of 20 percent,
and the collapse of the gold standard in Germany led to the anticipation that
England could not maintain the gold standard and interest rates leading to the
mass selling of the sterling in late 1930 and 1931.107 The mass loss of
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confidence in the gold standard leading to an exodus from sterling forced interest
rate increases that could not be maintained with an extremely high
unemployment rate. On September 19, 1931 Great Britain was forced to stop
convertibility to the gold standard which caused the ultimate death of the interwar
gold standard international system.108
The sterling, which had been one of the most powerful currencies in the
world lost a great amount of its value and caused a weakening of confidence
against other currencies such as the dollar. Fear of the dollar being devalued
lead to a mass selling of the dollar, forcing the Federal Reserve to increase its
interest rates. At the end of 1931, a dozen or so more countries left the gold
standard, and in 1932, with the election of Franklin D. Roosevelt, the United
States suspended convertibility to the gold standard after numerous bank runs.
The rest of the world was soon to follow.109 The fall of the second international
gold standard led to another period of managed float until after the Second World
War. The volatility that plagued the floating exchange system during the 1920’s
was much more tame and controlled during the 1930’s and governments could
do what was best for them and did not have to worry about maintaining a world
gold standard system.110
The devaluation and depreciation of currency led to aid in the recovery
process from the Great Depression. Despite the less volatile and consistent
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performance from the new managed float system of the 1930’s, the world viewed
it as unstable with memories still lingering from the 1920’s floating system that
was characterized by high inflation and political instability. 111 Another reason why
a new system would eventually be implemented was the protectionist currency
policies economists believed that the managed float system led too. Exchange
rate fluctuations were seen by many as a potential source of conflict. After the
Second World War the United States had emerged as the preeminent world
power and sought a new system with a stable exchange rate and greater
longevity.112
The Gold Standard System was the first definable and manageable
international financial system, and it shaped the future of the international
economy and the two future international financial systems. As we will see the
Bretton Woods System would actually be pegged at a certain rate to an
established price of gold. The gold standard and the advent of the international
finance system lead to the establishment of the central banks which now
dominate international finance and international transactions. The gold standard
for the first time allowed focus on monetary adjustments and national
management instead of just national accumulation of capital.113
As nations’ monetary focus started to shift to exchange rates and gold
flows monetary policy became suited toward an adjusting circulation of currency
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in the economy and the balance of payments.114 The gold standard set the
foundations for stability and interdependence globally which is what is still strived
for today. The gold standard is an important part of economic history and had a
direct influence over future international monetary systems such as Bretton
Woods. The creation of central banks alone could be counted among one of the
greatest innovations not only in international finance but economics as a whole.
No matter what financial system is put into place, the key is creating an
atmosphere that leads to interdependence of countries and coordination between
powers in international finance. This is only possible if countries, or at least
countries that are a major power in international finance, have the same goals
and interests. Even allies with the same political aspirations can come to a
crossroads when it comes to international economic policy and the
implementation of an international financial system. Countries are going to act in
a way that best suits their interests economically within reason. High inflation and
constant crisis did not give the interwar gold standard much of a chance to
survive. The turmoil of the inter-war period would lead to the creation of a more
stable international system that tried to correct the shortcomings and instability of
the previous era.
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Section 5: The Bretton-Woods System
Transition from War
The second major international financial system that would forever change
the course of modern international finance came out of the Bretton Woods
Agreement. The Bretton Woods System, which dominated the landscape of the
international financial system for almost thirty years, was one of the most grandly
coordinated economic agreements or treaties between major countries in history.
Much of the architecture of the Bretton Woods system is borrowed from the gold
standard system and the Bretton Woods system relied on domestic currencies
being made convertible at a fixed price into an asset.115 One of the main points of
the Bretton Woods System was that there would be an international currency
which all currencies could be fixed to, considering that currency an extension of
their own. This would mean that there is in fact one world money that would
greatly promote trade and development among the countries using the system.116
The creators of the Bretton Woods system saw the easy convertibility of
international currencies as an essential part for confidence in the stability of the
national currencies and international currency, but also wanted to use the
previous gold standard as a basis for the system.
One crucial difference between the gold standard and the Bretton Woods
System was the creation of a new institution that would become known as the
International Money Fund (IMF). The IMF would function to sanction
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governments that were fiscally irresponsible and hurt the international system
while advocating for countries that were hurt by such actions.117 The IMF was a
line of defense for those adhering to the Bretton Woods Financial system. All of
these policies came out of deficiencies of the gold standard and interwar years to
try and provide a stable monetary system that was better able to police itself and
deal with both internal and external shocks prevalent in the world economies.
Unfortunately these changes, which tried to safeguard from instability, did not
function as effortlessly as scholars thought they would on paper when they were
thrust into action.118
The Bretton Woods System was an achievement even when considering
its weaknesses and eventual downfall because of the monetary collaboration
between many sovereign nations with their own agenda that the Bretton Woods
System represented. An agreement like Bretton Woods is so rare and
extraordinary because of the unprecedented cooperation between world powers
that have their own interests at heart. It is arguable that the rebuilding climate in
the early 1940’s resulting from the end of World War Two led to the right
atmosphere for such an agreement as Bretton Woods. It is unlikely that there will
ever be such collaboration of nations on an international finance system like
there was at Bretton Woods in the near future, if ever again at all.
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The Bretton Woods system was being developed by the United States and
Great Britain as early as 1940.119 Great Britain and the United States started
working toward a joint agreement during this time to create a new international
financial system that fixed the problems of the gold standard and led to stable
world trade and currency exchange. The United States emerged as the strongest
economy in the world after the 1st World War and Great Britain, which was the
predominant economy before that, was still one of the most powerful and
influential economies in the world.120
Bretton Wood Meeting: Keynes and White
The leading British financial official working to create the Bretton Woods
system was John Maynard Keynes whose book The General Theory of
Employment, Interest, and Money is one of the most widely regarded economic
works of the time. Keynes was maybe the most well-known and greatest
economist the world had to offer. Leading the negotiations for the Americans was
Harry Dexter White, a lesser known former academic and United States Treasury
economist. The goals of the economists in regard to the International Financial
System was to create a system that would have stable fixed exchange rates,
allow national currencies to be converted to gold or an international currency,
provide the liquidity that gold standard previously lacked, and have an effective
mechanism to adjust exchange rates correcting disequilibrium in the balance of
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payments.121 As stated earlier, these goals remain true for any international
monetary system.
The IMF was created to help adjust the balance of payments for nations
that ran a deficit. The IMF helped to correct deficits and was created to protect
countries from external and internal shocks. The existing amount of gold in the
world was believed to be too low to have a great amount of pressure put on it, so
the two- tier system was created with a major currency being convertible into
acting as an extension of currency to settle international payments and
transactions.122 This major extension or acting international currency would
conserve the gold stock and make the international markets more liquid.
John Maynard Keynes and Harry Dexter White each had a plan for the
international financial system after the war and those two plans differed in many
ways. One thing the two plans had in common is that they each had the interest
of their respective countries; Great Britain and the United States, in mind, trying
to get the other nations to agree to a plan that would most protect and advance
its country’s financial priorities. Keynes wanted to try to preserve what was left of
Great Britain’s dwindling economic power, while White wanted to exercise the
United States’ economic dominance over the rest of the world to gain favorable
conditions after World War II for the nation that had become the premier world
economic giant.123
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Keynes took a more civilized approach into the Bretton Woods talks but
was not an able enough politician to sway the Americans in Washington, while
White was gritty, determined, and very brash often clashing with Keynes. Keynes
and White’s visions for the world economy were vastly different. White wanted to
take advantage of the opposite directions of power that the two economic giants
were headed in.124 White saw a world that did not have many controls in it with a
pegged currency exchange rate presided over by an international institution that
had the power to veto changes. Keynes wanted to allow countries to be able to
change and alter exchange rates to let countries reconcile a balance of payments
with full employment.125
Keynes had a focus on the balance of payments financing plan that held
a country like the United States accountable to finance the drawing rights of other
countries. White championed the American dollar as a possible world currency
but also believed that it had to be backed by metal. Keynes had a more nontraditional idea about the international currency he called bancor.126 In Keynes’
plan the national central banks, and not an international bank, would buy and sell
their currencies amongst themselves to settle credits and debts. Their own
currencies however would be denominated in international money that Keynes
called the bancor which was to have its own fixed exchange rate with gold and all
participating currencies.127
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Basically the national banks would exchange their currency or gold to
bancors to settle balance of payments credits and debts with other countries.
Limits would be imposed on the spending and accumulating of bancors in
Keynes plan so countries did not have too high a surplus or deficit. This idea was
sympathetic to British interests in that they had little gold but needed lots to
trade.128
Both plans were built around a new international monetary institution but
were different in what that institution would have the power to do. White was
stoutly against Keynes new international currency, predictably wanting a dollar
based system. Both White and Keynes plan looked to reduce trade barriers and
tariffs. Going into the Bretton Woods talks the United States had all the leverage
because they had all the gold and were the most powerful economy in the world,
while Britain only had the advantage of not taking part in an international plan
trying to destroy a new global architecture which would not be creditable without
the perceived power that was the former economic goliath of the British
Empire.129
Keynes wanted to make the major creditor nations solely responsible for
settling the balance of payments. The United States would have been the nation
most adversely affected by this policy that Keynes saw as crucial to the new
monetary system because they had ran a constant payments surplus in the
1930’s. This would have made the United States responsible for 23 million
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dollars to help settle the balance of payments. Keynes was confident that he
could convince the other international powers of the world to adopt many of his
ideas for the post war world.130 Keynes stated that “I have considerable
confidence that something very like this plan will be in fact adopted, if only on
account of the plain demerits of the alternative of rejection.”131 Keynes
underestimated the international political power that was the United States in the
post war period and the bargaining dominance that came with that position. In
the end the Americans refused to pay more than 8 million to settle the balance of
payments.132
What Keynes did have in common with the rest of the world, though, was
his insistence that the rigidity of the gold standard was outdated and a return to
the gold standard would be a grievous mistake.133 Keynes knew that a new more
flexible international system was needed but had to concede to the American’s
anywhere in the plan where the American delegation thought the United States
would be at a minor disadvantage. Keynes essentially created the outline of the
Bretton Wood’s system which then over months of deliberation was amended by
White and the American contingent to reflect America’s prominence and power.
Keynes was forced to concede on his balance of payments accountability plan
and want for an international currency. The American’s defiantly benefited from
the new system but did not have exactly the completely flexible system free of
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controls, which White had imagined. In the end the greatest achievement of
Bretton Woods was the short period of international cooperation. Keynes said it
best when he stated that “We have shown that a concourse of 44 nations are
actually able to work together at a constructive task in amity and unbroken
concord.”134 In my opinion, this kind of international cooperation was an
aberration in history and might never again be obtained.
Description of the System and Flaws
The system that was created at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire in July of
1944 was a system that championed the American agenda and would reign
supreme as the international monetary system for the next 27 years. Harry
Dexter White and the Americans dominated the negotiations and were able strike
a deal with representatives from 44 other nations, including Great Britain, which
was favorable to the United States. After lengthy bargaining and intellectual
discussion, the representatives signed the Articles of Agreement of the IMF.135
The newly created International Monetary Fund represented a set of rules
and guidelines to govern the international monetary policies of the central banks.
The International Monetary Fund was basically created to enforce the “rules of
the game” that characterizes the interdependent monetary relationships between
the economies of the world. The IMF was created to keep a strong balance in the
international economy, something that the Gold Standard System always lacked.
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The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development was also created to
aid in reconstruction of European economies after the Second World War and
would later become known as the World Bank.136
The representatives at Bretton Woods wanted to stop the economic
nationalism that was a main flaw in the Gold Standard system and interwar
years. This was a misguided attempt that was doomed to fail as economic
nationalism is still a tenet of today’s international economic system and is nearly
impossible to eliminate from the international economic and political arena. Even
the representatives and countries at the Bretton Woods Conference were
exercising a form of economic nationalism by trying to support an agreement that
would leave their country in the best international economic position possible.137
This economic nationalism was true in the case of both Keynes and White whose
plans and bargaining characterized two men who were trying to gain favorable
international economic advantage or in Keynes case salvation for their respective
countries.
What came out of the Bretton Woods agreement was an adjustable
pegged system that was a compromise between the Keynes’ plan and White
plans, resembling more the American proposal than Great Britain’s. Keynes plan
focusing on the Bancor, had an international clearing union that would take
payments and deposits in Bancor to settle the international balance of payments
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between two countries.138 The American’s put forward a plan that championed a
currency pool, in which each country participating paid into so they could later
borrow that money when a short term balance of payments defecit period
arose.139
There was as previously stated a slight compromise between the British
and American plans, but the American plan, enjoying America’s exorbitant
privilege mostly won out. What came was an international monetary system
where each country would establish a par value pegged to the American dollar
which was pegged to gold at the rate of 35 dollars per ounce.140 This new dollar
pegged gold system or gold exchange standard relied heavily on the dollar
despite Keynes’ reservations making the dollar essentially the international
currency.141
Each country in Bretton Woods had to maintain one percent of the par
value buying or selling in the foreign exchange market as needed to stay within
the one percent of par value. Only a country that had a constant disequilibrium in
the balance of payments would be allowed to change the par value of its
currency to move back into equilibrium. The United States dollar as the
international reserve currency was the only currency convertible to gold and each
country had to hold a stock of dollars to settle international transactions.142 This
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would be a flaw of the system in the future and put a tremendous amount of
pressure on the American dollar to maintain its convertibility at a constant price.
Although the Bretton Woods System was first conceptualized in the mid
1940’s right after the Second World War, it really did not take hold as the
international system to around 1958. After the war, the international financial
system was a mess and the British sterling was still very strong in the market,
because in the past, with Britain as the major super power for a number of years,
it had been the dominant currency.143 It took a number of years for the dollar to
take its place and for the Bretton Woods system to go into effect. The United
States dollar was so strong that as a result of its emergence as a super power
and Europe’s need to rebuild, the United States had to actively pursue the policy
of running a deficit for a number of years to weaken the dollar and improve
international liquidity.144
The Marshall and Dodge plans provided aid to Europe and Japan to
rebuild their economies and currencies. As a result the period from the end of
the war to the late 1950’s was characterized by controls on exchange
transactions. European nations maintained overvalued currencies to allow
residents to be able to buy dollars cheaply in this period to stimulate trade.145 As
a result there was a constant demand for dollars and not enough dollars to
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appease demand which brought about the regulation of dollars resulting in
currencies not being freely convertible.
This led to the creation of the European Payments Union and the Bank for
international settlements. These institutions made the system of payments that
were multilaterilized. After a month a country would either pay or receive gold or
dollars for its international transactions. Only a fraction of the exchange however
was paid in actual dollars or gold and the rest was converted to a loan to the
creditor country.146 The fraction to be settled in gold or dollars was steadily
increased from month to month. This allowed the liquidity of currency and by the
late 1950’s the European and Japanese economies were substantially stronger
allowing the conversion of their currency to dollars to take place effectively
bringing a start to the new monetary Bretton Woods system as originally
conceptualized.147
During the late 1940’s and through the 1950’s there were cracks in the
Bretton Woods system because of the financial crisis that major European
economies found themselves in after the war. One such crisis happened in 1947
when Great Britain tried to restore the convertibility of the artificially inflated
Sterling because of a loan agreement with the United States.148 The sterling was
only able to stay convertible for 6 weeks because of massive reserve losses that
nearly depleted all of Great Britain’s reserves including the multibillion dollar
American loan that convinced the British to make their currency convertible. After
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the conversion crisis in Great Britain the United States no longer put pressure on
other nations to make their currencies convertible until they had been sufficiently
recovered by the Marshall Plan.149
During the early 1950’s the gap between the strength of the dollar and
other world currencies continued to widen until 1953 when the European and
Asiatic economies’ trade balance slowly continued to strengthen. The steady flow
of aid provided by the Marshall Plan and the struggled but continuous growth of
economies around the world, closed the dollar gap and allowed previously
devastated economies to recover and have a positive trade surplus.150 The
United States finally, after years of artificially weakening its currency, slipped into
a trade deficit in 1958, and the rest of the world’s economies began restoring
current account convertibility. The Bretton Woods System finally began working
as designed and following the Bretton Woods agreement characterizing the end
of a financial reconstruction period.151
Even though the Bretton Woods System began to work as designed,
problems continued to persist with the international financial system and flaws
became apparent during the 1960’s. The Bretton Woods System required credit
to finance imbalances which was the job of the IMF. One problem was that weak
currency countries always lobbied for high IMF quota’s to increase international
reserves while strong currency countries opposed international reserve countries
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to prevent the weaker currencies taking what they believed was too much credit
from the reserves to correct imbalances.152
Another problem with the international reserve system under Bretton
Woods was that it was dependent on the availability of dollars allowing the United
States to dictate international liquidity for the other world economies. The “scarce
currency clause” was a stipulation in the IMF that if it ran out of stock of a
particular country’s currency, that the currency would be considered a “scarce
currency”, resulting in the expected discrimination against the goods of the
“scarce currency’s” country. The “scarce currency clause” and IMF quotas were
supposed to make the system more compatible for currency exchange as time
went on and economies recovered from the war. The recovery of European and
world currencies actually led to more dependence on the dollar. The dollar would
continue its strength throughout the Bretton Woods era, remaining the supreme
leading currency reserve over the entirety of the system.153 This was a problem
because it led to pressure on the dollar as an international reserve currency. The
United States had to make dollars readily available to the rest of the world while
maintaining confidence that the dollar would always be convertible to gold at 35
dollars per ounce of gold. This was also a problem because the United States
had a tremendous amount of economic power. Some countries, such as France,
wanted to act in the best interest of their country, and did not care for their setting
policies that were constantly dependent on the United States decisions.
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Basically under the Bretton Woods System, the liquidity and conversions
of the world’s reserve assets depended on the policy of the United States and
their willingness to make the dollar more or less available to the other economies
of the world. Many scholars refer to this dilemma as the “de Gaulle problem”
because French president Charles de Gaulle was usually the greatest detractor
from the inherent American power built into the Bretton Woods System.154
The Bretton Woods System was the most ambitious and perhaps the most
flawed of all the international financial systems. Once the Bretton Woods System
began to work as designed a number of flaws and weaknesses became apparent
to the system.155 While the pegged dollar exchange rate provided a stable
environment for trade and economies to grow for a number of years throughout
the 1960’s, it had many weaknesses. The system’s shortcomings in the balance
of payments adjustment process, its lack international liquidity, and the Triffin
Dilemma lead to an eventual breaking down in the stability and growth of the
system.156
Bretton Woods Decline
The Bretton Woods system had major flaws that eventually brought the
system to an end as the acting international financial system in the late 1960s
and early 1970s. The Bretton Wood system assumed that the dollar was as good
as gold, and as the ailing economies recovered and the supply of dollars
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increased, this no longer became the case.157 Eventually American liabilities to
foreign countries came to exceed the amount of gold that United States actually
held. This is a flaw in the Bretton Woods system because while one currency
supply is elastic the other currency is fixed. The dollar is elastic while gold is
fixed. This leads to the Triffin dilemma which is if the United States refused to
provide dollars to other countries, then trade would become stagnant; but if the
United States did supply an unlimited amount of dollars, eventually confidence in
the United States to back up its dollars would diminish causing the international
financial system to become unstable.158
Eventually the United States would not be able to maintain a 35 dollar
fixed gold price. As long as countries came to an agreement not to convert their
currencies to gold, the system could be maintained. France in particular was
against this idea of maintaining the Bretton Woods system and refused to play by
the new rules of the international monetary game, not wanting to be second rate
to any country in any aspect, while others like Germany wanted to maintain in the
current system.159 There was a great range of views by the participating
countries in the Bretton Woods system on what action to take on solving the
problems with the Bretton Woods financial system.
Special drawing rights or (SDR’S), were issued in 1969 in order solve the
problem and linked to gold at the value of one U.S dollar. While at first opposed
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to the idea of the SDR, the U.S would eventually change it position and accept
the SDR. Without the United States support, the SDR would have never been
approved. This did very little to curb the problem however, because governments
could not use the SDR paper currencies with the private sector and only with
other central governments. The second problems with SDR’s are that there had
to be a consensus among different countries on whether to issue the currency,
which rarely happened.160 These two aspects combined to give the SDR little
merit and effectiveness as an international reserve currency. The SDR had too
many restrictions and could not act as an international reserve currency without
the confidence of the private sector. Creating a legitimate currency takes time,
and the SDR was too little, too late to take pressure away from an already
embattled dollar.
In the end the Triffin Dilemma and Bretton Woods many other flaws would
bring the system down and make upholding the system dependent of the “rules
of the game.” Just as in the gold standard system, it was only a matter of time
before major economic powers would refuse to follow the rules of the game,
taking the action that was best for their individual constituents at the behest of
international finance system. Weaknesses in an international monetary system
led to instability that resulted in dependent international relationships breaking
down, causing the collapse of the international financial system.
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In 1967, Great Britain in the face of rising oil prices resulting from the
closing of the Suez Canal, devalued the pound, resulting in a sharp rise in the
price of gold. A two tier gold system was eventually created by the ten major
powers under the Bretton-Woods system after the United States had to close the
European gold market in the late 1960’s. This system created a fluctuating
private gold market and a steady gold market for the central banks still held at 35
U.S dollars. The flaw in this was any country could buy gold from the United
States at 35 U.S dollars and sell it for much more in the gold market. 161 This
would lead to constant runs on gold and the needed constant support of foreign
nations supporting the dollar to maintain the gold convertibility rate. There was
not enough gold to back the dollar leading to the instability of the whole financial
system. This Triffin Dilemma was unavoidable and the actions of the United
States in the 1960’s further exasperated the problem. The Kennedy and
Eisenhower, administrations instead of seeking to fix the Triffin Dilemma
problem, patched the undesirable outcomes of the dilemma, not actually solving
any problems inherent in the system. When inflation finally resulted in nations
devaluing and withdrawing their support from the dollar, the United States had no
choice but to close the gold window and salvage their international economic
position.162
When Richard Nixon came to be president in 1968, he tried scaring the
European nations into tactics that would help the Unites States international
financial system, and when these tactics backfired, the United States devalued
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the dollar, stopped converting dollars into gold and put a 10 percent surcharge on
imports to make sure American products would not be influenced by unfair
exchange rates. This shrewd financial move won the United States a newly
created exchange rate system, much like the old one except with the dollar being
devalued and the U.S Treasury not responsible for exchanging gold for dollars in
1971. Continued policy decisions by the Nixon administration led to the printing
of more money and higher inflation leading the price of gold to also increase to
over 70 U.S dollars per ounce.163 Countries began abandoning the pegged
exchange rate system in effect ending the second major international financial
system known as the Bretton Woods System even though this took a number of
years to accomplish. In 1973 the Bretton Woods System effectively came to an
end and a few months later, the world converted to a floating exchange rate
system.164
The Bretton Woods System provided stability and growth to an
International finance system that had previously been chaotic and unstable. The
currency pegged gold system had miraculously held together for 30 years
despite constant weaknesses and problems that kept arising. It is an amazing
accomplishment that a number of different countries with different economic
goals compromised and played by the rules of the game to maintain the Bretton
Woods System for so long.165
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Cooperation between governments during the 1960’s and 70’s to keep
the Bretton Woods System afloat for so long is a feat that had never been
previously accomplished and might never be accomplished again on an
international level. The cooperation of countries with different economic goals to
maintain a comprehensive international monetary system was the most
impressive aspect of the Bretton Woods System.166 Different countries working
together to maintain the international monetary system is what led to the stability
that grew the international economy for two decades despite the inherent
weaknesses of the system. While at first different governments banded together
in a common strength, eventually domestic economic goals and countries doing
what was best for them led to an abandoning of the international financial
system.167 In international finance, stability, which comes from a group of
different countries upholding the same rules in the same system, is always
fleeting.
In the end despite a constant patching together of the many weaknesses
that characterized the Bretton Woods international monetary system the lack of
an automatically adjustable balance of payments mechanism and the Triffin
paradox lead to the demise of Bretton Woods. Constant deficits by the United
States put pressure on the dollar, and despite patchwork agreements like the
Smithsonian Agreement, the United States central bank closed the gold window
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to protect the dollars’ international advantage.168 The Bretton Woods System
corrected the instabilities of the international gold standard but possessed its own
disadvantages which led to its demise. The two tier convertibility system that
defined Bretton Woods had just as many outlying weaknesses as the gold
standard. International cooperation would follow the normal pattern of history and
fold under the challenges that were presented with maintaining a stable
international financial system over the long run.
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Section 6: The International Managed Float System
Description and Different International Arrangements
What emerged from the failure of the Bretton Woods System was not a
system with more control but instead an international finance system with more
freedom and less controls. In the mid- 1970’s the managed floating exchange
rate system came into existence and has persisted as the international monetary
system. Under this floating exchange rate system money flows freely, but there is
no price guarantee.169 A floating exchange rate is where a country’s currency is
not fixed to any other nations’ and the exchange rate between two countries is
allowed to fluctuate against each other. When the United States stopped the
dollar’s convertibility to gold, which caused the collapse of the Bretton Woods
System, the nation went to a managed floating exchange rate system. After the
United States abandoned the Bretton Woods Systems, the major economies of
the world followed its example, all converting to a managed float system. The
strength of this system is that rates automatically adjust to equilibrium and
countries can lessen the impact of shocks, and avoid the balance of payment
and natural resource problems inherent in gold based fixed exchange rates.170
Countries can control and create policies to affect exchange rates relative to
other countries hence the term “managed float”.
Countries with large economies that could handle the exchange rate
uncertainty and major capital outflows that were persistent in the managed
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floating exchange rate system let their currencies float while economically weak
countries adopted the policy of pegging their currencies to a stronger floating
currency like the dollar.171 These developing countries, who could not tolerate the
uncertainty of an ever changing exchange rate, established the fixed currency
peg and maintained tight controls to help maintain exchange rates against major
economic trading partners. As time went on however more and more countries
opted to let their currency float freely against other countries because pegging
the exchange rate became increasingly costly with technological progress, a
decrease of capital controls, and the risk of losing foreign financial investments to
other financial centers with less restrictive controls.172
An example of this is the arrangement that was known as the European
Snake. In the European Snake the independent countries of Western Europe
tried to keep their respective currencies pegged within a 2.25 percent exchange
rate fluctuation band that had been outlined in the Smithsonian Agreement in the
early 1970’s.173 The removal of capital controls in the late 1980’s made (what
was known as) the European Monetary System problematic and costly to
operate. Keeping up with exchange rate parity that increased with time and the
technological advance of the floating exchange system was difficult if not almost
impossible. The Western European countries had to keep widening the band of
allowable fluctuation until it eventually hit 15 percent in the early 1990’s.174

171

Barry Eichengreen, Globalizing Capital: A History of the International Monetary System, 136-138.
Barry Eichengreen, Globalizing Capital: A History of the International Monetary System, 140-144.
173
Ibid, 152-153.
174
Henry C. Wallich, “ The Evolution of the International Monetary System” in The International Monetary
System: Choices for the Future, ed. Michael B. Connolly(New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982), 284-286.
172

79

Some small countries have tried to maintain an adjustable exchange rate
peg by creating currency boards which adopt constitutional laws or amendments
requiring the central banks of the corresponding governments to peg their
currency to that of a major trading partner. This takes away political pressure to
do anything but maintain an adjustable peg, but it takes away the ability of the
country to act as a lender of last resort to intervene in their economy. This makes
currency boards with maintained exchange rate pegs only viable in small
countries that depend on foreign support and have undeveloped financial
markets, if the currency board is in fact viable at all.175
Another option is to try to maintain a pegged exchange rate in an
unpegged world. Moving toward or participating in a monetary union, such as the
European Union has done recently with its origin in the European Central Bank
that was established in the early 1990s. The euro has been a relatively
successful endeavor even with the recent pressure put on the currency from the
2008 financial crisis. The monetary union really remains essentially the only
acceptable option to independent free floating exchange rates.176
Inception, Stability, and Different Crises
The floating exchange rate system was ratified by the IMF in 1976
resulting in the Jamaica Agreement. The details of the agreement included the
declaration that flexible exchange rates were acceptable, that central banks were
allowed to intervene in exchange markets, and that gold was officially abandoned
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as an international reserve asset.177 The non-oil exporting and weaker
economies were also given more access to IMF funds and help. As time has
gone on, exchange rates have become more unpredictable. With the central
banks being able to control the monetary supply in the late 1970’s central banks
started printing money to finance deficits, and the importation of oil, helping to
lead to the period of inflation that characterized the late 1970’s.178
Some economists of the time had predicated absolute chaos in the foreign
exchange markets after the world adopted the free floating system. While there
was much greater exchange rate volatility than with the Bretton Woods fixed
exchange system, there was no chaos and collapse of the exchange rate system
as some economists had feared.179 Despite external oil shocks, no major
currency was extremely under or over-valued during the 1970’s which can be
considered a general success for the beginning of the floating exchange system.
A big part of this success was domestic policy adjustments that caused countries
to intervene in the exchange market to forward their domestic economic goals
and keep their exchange rates appreciating or depreciating toward equilibrium
depending on an economy’s particular goal.180
The first case of prolonged overvaluation without a return to equilibrium
came in the early 1980’s in the United States. Paul Volcker let interest rates rise
and the growth in the money supply fall to facilitate a decrease in the high
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inflation that plagued the United States in the late 1970’s. According to Interest
Rate Parity theory, the United States high interest dollar should have depreciated
against other country’s low interest rate currency. In this case the Interest Rate
Parity did not hold true. The United States interest rates and value of the dollar
rose as compared to other major powers currencies.181 The United States left it
to the market to push the dollar back to equilibrium, but instead it continued to
appreciate and maintain a period of overvaluation. Even when the United States
Interest rate began to fall, the currency still inexplicably appreciated. In 1985 the
five major G-5 countries met in New York City and agreed to try and depreciate
the dollar against other major currencies and solve the U.S trade deficit in what
was known as the Plaza Accord. The dollar started its decline in 1985 due to the
five major powers intervening in the exchange markets to depreciate the
dollar.182
The dollar would continue to rapidly depreciate throughout the 1980’s
which would lead to another problem in the international exchange market. The
Dollar was allowed to depreciate too far leading to the dollar being undervalued
for a period of time. When the dollar continued its decline instead of trending
back toward equilibrium in 1987, a meeting of the G-7 nations was called at the
Louvre. The meeting at the Louvre created an agreement known as the Louvre
Accord which ushered in a more managed free floating system.183 The G-7
countries agreed that they would cooperate to achieve greater exchange rate
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stability and more closely align their macroeconomic policies. This lead to an
increased stability even though the dollar continued to be undervalued
throughout the early 1990’s because a lack of policy implementation that was
previously agreed to in the Louvre Accord. The dollar finally began to appreciate
again in the late 1990’s due to a technology boom where foreign investment
reached a high rate in the United States.184

European Union and Corresponding Table
While the United States and many of the major Asian economies followed
an unfettered but “managed” free float system, the European nations continued
to focus on monetary unification. The European nations replaced their original
snake agreement with the European Monetary System in 1979. The EMS was
created to ensure a region of monetary stability paving the way for a system of
combined currency for the nations of Europe. The two main mechanisms of the
EMS were the European Currency Unit and the Exchange Rate Mechanism. The
European Currency Unit was a kind of basket currency that took into account
weights based on each currency’s GNP and share in the EU trade. The
Exchange Rate Mechanism or ERM was the procedure by which the nations of
the EU managed their exchange rates. The mechanism is a parity based system
in which par values are computed in terms of the European Currency Unit.
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Throughout the 1990’s the European nations coordinated their fiscal and
monetary goals to try and achieve a union of their economies.185
On January 1st 1999 what has become known as the European Monetary
Union adopted the euro as a common currency to rival the dollar and other major
currencies of the world.186 While the euro has run into weaknesses exposed by
the 2008 financial crisis with its stronger economies having to support its weaker
ones, the euro has remained a viable currency. While it has not become the rival
to the dollar that many economists thought it might be, it is still one of the most
used and significant currencies in the world. The euro has been a nice
experiment and has shown decent resolve in the recent financial crisis when
many thought it might fail. This is demonstrated in Table 1.
Table 1.1: Currency Composition of Official Foreign Exchange Reserve 2008-2012
Claims in
Currency
Claims in
U.S. dollars

Claims in
pounds
sterling

Claims in
Japanese
yen

Claims in
Euros
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Data Source
Currency
Composition of
Official Foreign
Exchange
Reserves
(COFER)
Currency
Composition of
Official Foreign
Exchange
Reserves
(COFER)
Currency
Composition of
Official Foreign
Exchange
Reserves
(COFER)
Currency
Composition of
Official Foreign
Exchange
Reserves
(COFER)

Unit

Scale

US
Dollars

Billions

US
Dollars

US
Dollars

US
Dollars

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

1477.437

1583.921

1764.447

2006.002

2051.665

59.063

67.742

68.165

76.702

99.568

93.869

95.251

121.146

132.512

165.266

514.359

620.637

650.831

675.781

800.492

Billions

Billions

Billions
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Claims in
other
currencies

Currency
Composition of
Official Foreign
Exchange
Reserves
(COFER)

US
Dollars

Billions
53.882

62.947

105.155

124.253

96.195

Source: “Currency Composition of Official Foreign Exchange Reserve,” International Monetary
Fund: Data and Statistics, last modified 2011, accessed August 19th, 2014, http://www.imf.org
/external/data.htm

As long as the political and economic agendas of the European powers
continue to be the same, the euro will survive. Eventually though, as history has
shown, a nation will follow its own economic agenda in the face of repeated
economic pressures. When a crisis arises that leads one of the major powers of
the EU (such as Germany) away from maintaining the euro, and in a different
direction, the EU will be hard pressed to maintain the status quo, resulting in
possible collapse or change. History has shown that no political economic
alliance, no matter how strong, lasts forever.
There have been two other major crises under the floating exchange
finance system. The Mexican peso crisis started in 1994 when the Mexican
government decided to devalue the peso against the dollar by 14 percent. This
devaluation caused a run on selling peso as well as Mexican stocks. The peso
fell against the dollar by as much a 40 percent and forced the peso or Mexico to
enter a international float. Investors turned away from Mexico and other Latin
American markets.187 The United States and the IMF eventually would have to
bail out Mexico, for its government to avoid default. This crisis would lead to a 50
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billion dollar bailout fund for the IMF who could bailout countries who face turmoil
and default. This crisis led to the realization that a single country could not
handle a global crisis alone in this age of interdependent global economies.188
The Asian currency crisis was another period of fragility during the 1990’s.
The Thai baht, which had been fixed or pegged to the U.S dollar, was devalued
leading to a global crisis. Countries in the Asiatic and in Latin America saw their
currencies start to dramatically depreciate against the major currencies. Many
institutions in these countries were forced to default leading to a long lasting
recession in Asia and South America.189 In a globally interdependent world the
effects were felt all over and even in the United States as the government had to
bailout Long Term Capital Management, a hedge fund company that invested
heavily in Russian stocks and bonds. The crisis was caused by a weak domestic
financial system using inconsistent economic policy and spread through the free
flows of capital that define the floating exchange rate system and a globally
dependent economy.190 The IMF would have to bailout the hardest hit countries
before they would start to recover. Weak currencies and financial systems
combined with the increased freedom of financial markets have created currency
crises under the flexible exchange rate system.191

188

Ibid, 585-588.
Ibid, 586-587.
190
James Tobin, “ Financial Globalization: Can National Currencies Survive?” ( paper presented at Cowles
Foundation for Research in Economics Conference, New Haven, Connecticut, July 1998).
191
Barry Eichengreen, Globalizing Capital: A History of the International Monetary System,188-190.
189

86

Strengths, Weaknesses, and Future
The world continues to adhere to the managed floating exchange system
which has both its strengths and weaknesses. Despite what I have described to
support the system, many economists claim that the current International
financial system of managed floating exchange rates has been detrimental to the
growth of the global financial system and is too unstable. In the floating exchange
system countries are forced to move through cycles where their currencies are
either overvalued or undervalued for long periods of time. Interventions by
countries in their international exchange rates and monetary policies have often
caused declines in trade and have held trade between countries back. 192
Countries like China can use unfair monetary policies to keep the value of their
currency low compared to other countries and stimulate exports for example.
Many economists thought that the balance of payment problems that affected the
Bretton Woods system and brought its demise would not affect the floating
exchange rate system. Large amounts of debt and deficit have been collected by
major industrial nations threatening financial viability during the last couple
decades which has not been quickly corrected by arbitrage.193
One reason for this is that countries influence their own decisions more in
this system and there is no agreement on what is good for the world economy
but instead only national economies. The second reason is that the high
variability of exchange rates has reduced the effectiveness of nations in changing
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prices and quantities in international trade.194 These are some of the reasons
some economist and nations have lobbied for a fixed exchange rate system or a
system like the gold standard. A Fixed international financial system leads to long
term stability and curbs the cycles the floating exchange rate system goes
through. Many economists have proposed going back to the gold standard
system because of its simplicity and stability. They seem to ignore the fact that
gold is a limited resource that cannot be readily made like currency and
eventually confidence in the currencies pegged gold will decline as more
currency needs to be printed in continually growing economies.195
The development of the current managed float international finance
system is the culmination of a history of change in international finance that
progressed from the gold standard and fixed exchange Bretton Woods System
and will eventually result in further change to international finance. The history of
the international financial system can help us to critically examine the current and
past systems of international finance determining the strengths and flaws of each
system. The international financial system has gone through perpetual changes
throughout its history and will continue to go through small and large changes,
even if those changes aren’t in the near foreseeable future.196 In this ever
growing global economy, philosophies over the best global monetary system are
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abundant and controversial making the only thing certain about the future of the
international economy is that nothing is certain.
Section 7- Conclusions and the future of the IFS
Arguments for a Floating Exchange System
The international financial system can be characterized in the current
world of interdependent economies as the loosely maintained trade and
monetary arrangement in which countries act independently in their best
interests, affecting other economies and the financial system as a whole. The
international monetary system it seems is always on the precipice of change,
with economists forever arguing about which international system worked best in
the past and will perform best in the future, meeting the needs of an ever
evolving economic system. History has demonstrated to the modern world that
there is no perfect system and that the world usually trades one set of economic
weaknesses for another set of economic weaknesses. While most economists try
to research and persuade others on which economic system is best, it is
probable that, as a whole, the world should be arguing about which system can
we live with and maintain to cultivate stability in a system that has proved to be
inherently unstable in the long run.197 The system that has been the most flexible
allowing for nations to act independently while maintaining some stability in the
interdependent world economy is the floating exchange system.
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While it is impossible to argue that the current floating exchange system
would be the best international system in every situation and every circumstance
the future might hold, a system with free floating exchange rates allows for
flexibility, use of effective monetary policy, and does not fail or breakdown from a
currency crisis. In the floating exchange rate system countries do not have to
follow what is known as the “rules of the game” and can instead make the best
choices for their economy independently through monetary policy. 198
Some of the blame for the failure of the gold standard and Bretton Woods
Systems respectively has to be attributed to different countries having to work
together economically and politically to ensure the survival of the system due to
currency crisis and a lack of confidence in currency. Once a major economy
decided that the current system did not benefit their economic goals, they would
abandon the “rules of the game” and act in their own best interest placing stress
on the international financial system. This stress, with a multitude of other factors
and weaknesses, would lead to the abandonment of the system and
implementation of a new system. This is both evident in the high inflation and
confidence problem that doomed the gold standard and the Triffin Dilemma
which outlined the weaknesses inherent in the Bretton Woods System. Despite
constant calls for a different international monetary arrangement, the floating
exchange system has been maintained for over 30 years due to its political
economic flexibility and adequacy as an international finance system.
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When a fixed regime rate is adopted, such as the Gold Standard and
Bretton Woods, the central banks of the world must interact following a set of
international rules known as the “rules of the game.” If these rules are
abandoned by one or more countries, it puts pressure on the remaining central
banks trying to maintain an international system. In some cases this diversion
from the “rules” can, with other factors, result in the failure or abandonment of an
international monetary system.199 One example of divergence occurred in the
early 1970’s under Bretton Woods. One can analyze this through the classic
economic game theory known as the “Prisoners Dilemma.”
“Prisoners Dilemma”
In the “Prisoners Dilemma” two prisoners convicted of a crime are offered
a deal. If the prisoner confesses he will receive a lighter sentence and the other
prisoner will receive a harsher sentence. If neither prisoner confesses, sentences
would be lighter than if both confessed. The rational outcome is that the
prisoners try to procure the lightest sentence for themselves and confess. The
rational outcome results in a slightly harsher sentence then if both prisoners were
silent but a more lenient sentence than if both confess.200
In international finance the same theory can be applied to central bank’s
following the rules of the game. If country A diverts from the “rules of the game,”
following their own best interest, it is able to grow and benefit from a positive
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economic reward, as long as country B continued to follow the “rules of the
game”. If central bank A and B follow the rules of the game, economic growth
will remain positive but not as positive as if one country diverted from the rules
while the other country followed. If central banks A and B don’t follow the rules,
the result is worse than if both followed but better for either bank A or B if they
upheld the rules while the other bank broke them. The rational outcome is that
both central bank A and B will break the rules, and follow their own agenda
because they don’t want the worst outcome which is if they followed the rules,
while the other bank broke them. This happens even though the best outcome is
clearly for them both to follow the “rules of the game.”
This is what eventually happened under the fixed rate regimes of the past.
The logical outcome is for rational countries to break the “rules of the game” at
the risk of another central bank doing this and reaping the rewards. Eventually as
central banks start to divert and break the rules, pressure is put on central banks
that remain true to the rules, resulting in the failure of the fixed regime rate
system. There can be no “rules of the game” present in an international monetary
system because central banks will rationally do what is best for their country and
break those rules. One advantage of free floating exchange rate systems is that
there are no rules, and central banks are allowed to follow their own best interest.
Before the Bretton Woods System met its final demise, many economists
thought floating exchange rates were a lunacy that would result in pure chaos of
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the international financial system.201 Many thought floating exchange rates would
make the market so volatile and unpredictable that trade would be impacted and
that there would be no sustained international economic growth.202 While an
International managed float is prone to greater amounts of fluctuation than
pegged or fixed exchange rate system, the difference is not very dramatic and is
a small price to pay for the greater flexibility and prospective longevity without
failure that the current floating exchange rate system can provide. Hedging and
derivative tools in the foreign exchange markets also provide a way to protect
against instability and loss, promoting international trade.
Criticisms and Defense of Floating Exchange
Critics of the current floating exchange system have offered the same
criticisms since the beginning of the floating exchange. The first major criticism of
the free floating exchange regime is that it does not provide stability for trade and
economic growth. This phenomenon is greatly exaggerated and has been even
before floating exchange rates were prevalent in the international economy. 203
Floating exchange rates do have greater variability and are hard to predict in the
short run, but rigid exchange can’t be counted on to be upheld for a long period
of time without faltering like the gold standard and Bretton Woods Systems.
There is major criticism of the current international managed float financial
system, but a better system has not been created. The future of the international
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financial market looks remarkably like it does today with not much change in the
short or long run. Even if a new system was created by the international
community which it won’t be according to the history of other changes in the
financial system, it would take about ten years to actually take effect. In the long
run, cooperation between countries is not likely after so many years of
independence. Even with the global economy struggling from the recent
depression, the fact remains that countries don’t work well together and cannot
abide by the rules necessary in a fixed rate system. In this globally
interdependent economy countries act independently in their own best interest to
create the best economic conditions possible domestically. This resulted in the
downfall of the gold standard based financial system and would lead to the failure
of any future systems created that depend on an agreement between nations.
Nations have been conditioned to act in their own best interest over the
last four decades of the independent float system, and the ever changing capital
flows that have characterized the current system make it difficult to go back to a
pegged exchange world. Such collaboration between countries is extremely rare
unless it benefits all countries. While short term pacts between countries are
possible, they are inherently doomed to fail in the long run.
Another criticism of a floating exchange rate is that the balance of
payments mechanism does not adjust instantly to the market, creating prolonged
deficits and surpluses in the current accounts of countries.204 This is
fundamentally true despite the fact monetarist and proponents of the floating
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system have ignored this fact. One reason the floating exchange system does
not automatically adjust in the short run is because of government intervention in
the adjustment system. International capital flows can be distorted by
governments who constantly try to maintain more exports than imports and a
positive current account or even from uncontrolled private capital flows that are
constantly growing.
Many argue that under floating exchange rates there are constant
misalignments in which currencies are overvalued and undervalued. There were
also misalignments under the pegged system and the pegged system is also not
well equipped to deal with these currency misalignments.205 Breakdowns of
currency during pegged exchange rates are much more costly. With floating
exchange rates, the currency can adjust more fluidly to equilibrium, and
exchange rates can adjust to different market conditions. Periodic crisis is an
inevitable part of real world economics in a pegged system as well. The pegged
system is not equipped to handle these times of turmoil resulting, in high cost
and their eventual demise. Economists can design pegged exchange rate system
models that don’t experience such flaws, but those models do not work when
applied to the real and many fluctuating variables in the actual world economy.
Under floating exchange rates, countries create their own predicaments by not
exercising discipline. However, their problems are more easily correctable as the
exchange rate eventually adapts to different market conditions.
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These countries are following rational expectations and doing what is best
for their country’s economic situation. What critics like Joseph Stiglitz seem not to
realize is that countries didn’t exercise discipline under a fixed exchange rate
system either. The fact that countries like France did not exercise what some
economists consider discipline and follow the “rules of the game” led to the
demise of the Bretton Woods System.206 Many would argue that using the dollar
as the international reserve currency was the critical flaw of Bretton Woods, but
these failures are unavoidable no matter what currency is used if a major
economic power is in disagreement at any time during a currency’s existence.
The major world powers could not maintain a prolonged agreement even when
most nations were increasing their GNP yearly under the Bretton Woods
System.207 It seems pure lunacy that the major economies of the world would be
able to maintain an agreement today to maintain a fixed currency after more than
30 years of acting independently.
Inherent Flexibility in the System
Milton Friedman stated, “Our problem is not to “solve” a balance of
payments problem. It is to solve the balance of payments problem by adopting a
mechanism that will enable market forces to provide a prompt, effective and
automatic response to changes in conditions affecting international trade.”208 The
floating exchange rate does not adjust automatically as it should because central
governments try to control their exchange rates to gain an advantage to achieve
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a constant surplus and constantly increasing uncontrolled capital flows. The
dilemma is that the floating exchange rate system allows countries to use
monetary controls to pursue economic goals resulting in what some might
consider unethical actions by central governments. The fixed exchange rate
system does not allow countries to act in their best interest resulting in the
divergence of major economies in the fixed system, eventually contributing to its
unavoidable downfall. There is no easy solution to this problem unless a utopian
system was to be created combining the floating system’s flexibility with the fixed
systems stability and cooperation. Basically that would mean the creation of a
system where it was advantageous for every economy to act in the best interest
of all economies.
While it is nice to dream of such a perfect scenario, the fact is that the
floating exchange rate system, while not being the perfect system, maintains
somewhat of a balance and does not crumble under the pressure of countries
diverging from the support of a fixed exchange rate. The eventual solution to the
government export interference problem is the mounting pressure that will
continue to be placed on countries unfairly maintaining positive capital flows by
other major economies and world powers. While applying this pressure is often
held up in bureaucracy and world politics, once powerful economies pressure
artificially bolstered divergent economies to the point where it is not economically
and politically advantageous to artificially maintain such a system, divergent
countries will relent back to normalcy.209
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While many would see the IMF or another international economic agency
have the power to pressure and sanction countries who unfairly maintain a
balance of payments surplus, it would not be ideal because it would again be
proposing a veritable “rules of the game.”210 This would result in the dissolution of
the floating exchange rate system’s flexibility and lead to the demise of the
current and most well suited international system. If there was no government
interference and unrestricted capital flows, the balance of payments mechanism
might adjust more appropriately and immediately in theory, but because of
government interference it only adjusts appropriately in the long run.211 While it
is not the perfect system the current floating exchange rate system is the most
complete and maintainable of all the previous international financial systems.
Over the past 20 years, increased global monetary integration and rapidly
adjusting international transaction have led to a major increase in international
capital flows. Capital flows have increased by over 300 hundred percent while
trade flows have increased by a small margin comparatively of 26 percent.212
With external shocks affecting economies quicker than ever because of the
increase of capital flows it is important to have an adjustable exchange rate
system that allows governments to better deal with volatility. A rigid exchange
system with a finite amount of currency such as the gold standard and Bretton
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Woods System would fail as a result of the challenges of increased capital flows
in an increasingly globally interdependent world.
A pegged or rigid exchange rate regime also limits the tools available to a
government that is trying to reduce the economic shocks as a result of the
volatility of increased capital flows. In fixed exchange systems, monetary policy is
needed to adjust the exchange rate and balance the current accounts. If
monetary policy is used domestically, then it can’t be used in bringing equilibrium
to international agendas and long term imbalances in the current account occur.
Theoretically, flexible exchange rate systems automatically adjust, balancing the
current account, leaving fiscal policy free to use on domestic economic agendas.
In today’s world of instant international trading and constantly increasing capital
flows, there is no returning to fixed exchange rate system.213

The Future of International Finance
A major focus of many economists recently has been predicting the future
of the international finance system and asking what is the most desirable
system? In the near future it is prudent to think that the international monetary
system will look and operate the same as it does today. The international
financial system will still be under the regime of the current floating international
financial system. Over the past 30 years the system has evolved into more of a
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“managed float” instead of what economists like Milton Friedman had envisioned
when championing the free floating exchange rate system in the 1950s and
1960s.214 This trend will continue and the floating system will tend be more
managed and the exchange rate kept within more strict bands resulting in more
stability perhaps, but also more balance of payment and capital flow distortion.
The flexibility of the floating system allows it to evolve in the
interdependent world but, for the most part, the international financial system will
look remarkably the same in the next 10 to 15 years. As history has
demonstrated to us over the past 150 years, the international financial system
does not change rapidly overnight. Even though there has been a constant call
for change in the international system by many economists, change will take a
major economic crisis that results in political pressure and upheaval in one of the
major world economies. The United States, still the dominant economic power of
the world despite recent opinions that China is slowly becoming dominant, would
probably have to be on board with such a change.
A change in the international economic system has to result from the
major world economic powers thinking that it is the best course of action for their
nation resulting in some sort of agreement, which of course would eventually be
broken, resulting in more change. An example of this is the two major economic
powers of the day, creating the Bretton Woods System after World War II. Even
after such a system was created, it would take 10 to 15 years to go into effect
and work properly, as we saw with Bretton Woods and the current floating
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system.215 Between the development and implementation of a new international
finance system, it would take 15 to 25 years to become fully functional depending
on the amount of dissent between economic powers when the system is created.
Based on historical evidence, it is almost certain that the ever fluctuating
international monetary system will change from the managed float to a new
system eventually. In the immediate future however the floating exchange rate
system is the best option and will be maintained until a major crisis and economic
consensus among world powers leads to a gradual overhaul of the current
system. For the foreseeable future however, the floating system will remain
dominant and be argued over incessantly.
An important part of the floating exchange rate system moving forward is
what will be used as global currency. Since the end of the World War I and the
blossoming of the United States economy, the dollar has been essentially the
predominant international currency. The United States has reaped the reward of
seigniorage and the benefits that come with printing the international currency.
Many economists see the dollar’s reign coming to an end in the near future and
the rise of China’s renminbi and the still remaining albeit diminished present
threat of the euro. While economists tend to overstate the threat of other
currencies to the dollar’s premier global position, the dollar has been
considerably weakened against other currencies over the past decade.216
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America remains the strongest political and economic power in the world
presently, and the dollar will follow suit as international currency until that power
is challenged during a major global event. While another currency might rise to
become the international currency, it will do so slowly, little by little taking over
the dollar as the United States economic and political position decline. The dollar
will remain the international currency in the current floating exchange system in
the future because presently the United States is still the world’s predominant
economy.
Whatever nation in the world that is the strongest politically and
economically should have the exorbitant privilege that characterizes maintaining
the global currency, whether that currency is the dollar, the euro, or the renminbi.
It should be noted, the world power has to be economically capable of running
constant deficit as well. A global international currency, such as the bancor
proposed by Keynes or the weak SDR created by the IMF to save Bretton
Woods, is not feasible in today’s economic climate. Throughout the 20th century
the most advanced and strongest global power has affected global economic
policy decisions and exercised political pressure against those nations who have
not reflected their economic policy decisions. There is no greater example than
the United States cementing the dollar’s international reserve position during the
Bretton Woods Conference. Great Britain bent to the will of the new world
economic power in a changing of the guard essentially.217
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While an international reserve currency that isn’t a nation’s currency
would be much more stable and fair, the fact is that no powerful nation is going to
sacrifice their exorbitant privilege to make way for an independent international
currency. The nation would not only be betraying its own best interest but would
have to bolster and back up the new currency to give it a guarantee of legitimacy.
The United States currently, and any other nation in the future, would almost
certainly not be willing to bolster a new currency while giving up an economic
advantage. While Keynes’ idea for an international currency was brilliant and
would probably be the most fair and balanced international reserve currency, no
nation would ever agree to willingly give up it its economic power to back such a
currency. This very situation came to fruition at the Bretton-Woods conference
when America would not agree to an independent international reserve currency
and sought successfully to make the dollar the international reserve currency.
Keynes was one of the most brilliant economic minds of his time but was naïve
when it came to the politics that are so prevalent in international economics.218
A created form of international fiat to settle the current accounts balance
independent of national money will always take a back seat, even in international
finance to established strong national currencies. An international reserve
currency must have legitimacy and the confidence of the international
community. Creating new money that has the confidence of the people and
nations is nearly an impossibility on an international level and cannot happen
without the backing of the most powerful central banks of the world. The
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international reserve currency will remain the tender of the most powerful
economy in the world and independent reserve currencies will always be a
second line in international finance.
During the recent economic crisis, there has been an ever increasing
debate about the need for sovereign bankruptcy rules due to the high amount of
debt incurred by some European nations. Currently there is no formal procedure
for restructuring the debt of sovereign nations. The IMF have proposed a
mechanism and rules to restructure sovereign debt, but the creditor nations of
the world have given no support to this new proposed set of rules. The powerful
creditor nations don’t want to give up any freedoms or economic power to the
IMF or any set of world economic rules that might constrain them. Making it easy
to restructure sovereign debt might also lead to a reduction in sovereign lending
if a restructuring of debt is easier and less costly than the lending process.219
Any set of rules that seek to govern and supersede the power of any of
the strongest world economies will never be agreed to and would never work
unless the set of rules were advantageous to all of the most powerful world
economies. Without the consensus of the United States and other strong
economies the IMF will never be able to enact a set of strict sovereign
bankruptcy rules. Despite costly bailouts, powerful nations will come to the
support of foreign nations in danger of default. The modern interdependent world
of international finance dictates that creditor nations lend to bailout debtor nations
because of the impact of sovereign default would have on all nations of the
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world. When a powerful country knows that the sovereign bankruptcy of another
country might jeopardize the stability of their economy, the creditor nation will
come to the aid of the defaulting nation. While this may not be the most efficient
result, the powerful economies of the world would never allow a set of rules that
take away their flexibility and lending power.
The best international monetary system would be a free floating exchange
system with an instantly adjustable balance of payments capital flow mechanism
where government and central banks intervene as little as possible considering
both what is good for the world economy as well as their national economy.
Unstable capital flows would have to be regulated and tolerated to a certain
extent. The most stable international economic system is one without
commitments. Unfortunately politics and human tendency make the most
desirable options for a comprehensive international system a utopian unreality
that has many economists grasping at optimism and inapplicable ideas.
While the inability to control unregulated capital flows is a weakness of the
floating exchange system, James Tobin’s proposed currency transaction tax
known as the “Tobin Tax” offers a solution. The “Tobin Tax” is a small tax that is
levied on foreign exchange transactions that was proposed to lessen the severity
of exchange rate volatility due to capital flows. Tobin proposed a 0.5 % tax that
discourages very short term investments in foreign currency and lessens
exchange rate fluctuation.220 Tobin believed that the only ways offset short term
exchange volatility was either through his proposed currency tax or by moving
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toward a common currency with greater economic interdependence. While Tobin
preferred a uniform common currency, he saw this solution as impossible and
politically unviable. Tobin’s suggested tax would be proportional and take place
during spot rate conversions of currency. Each country would levy the uniform
tax and be responsible for collecting that tax within its borders. The tax could
then be deposited to an IMF fund. This “Tobin Tax” allows governments to
temper exchange rate volatility with minimal political cooperation.221
In addition to the “Tobin Tax” there have recently been other attempts to
regulate the risky unchecked movement of capital. There are many negative risks
that come with the increasing capital flows that have come characterize the
international float. These dangers include the risk that a country’s currency might
collapse following investor’s decisions to sell their holdings. It also includes the
risk that private and public borrowers that are susceptible to internal and external
shocks will have the inability to meet their obligations.222 Another concern of
unchecked capital flows is the risk that owners of liquid financial assets will seek
to sell of their holdings at the sign of a shock, increasing instability of assets in an
economy.223
One of the proposed alternatives to the transaction taxes that both Tobin
and Keynes proposed are known as “trip wires” and “speed bumps.” “Trip wires”
are any economic indicators that warn policy makers when an economy is
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approaching a high level of currency and investor flight risk. “Speed Bumps” are
capital control policies or measures that target capital flow risk when an economy
demonstrates signs of instability or massive financial movements. A possible
economic “trip wire” that might warn policy makes of capital flow risk is the ratio
of official reserves to total short term external obligations. Some possible “speed
bumps” that economic policy makes could use to slow down capital flows are
limiting the convertibility of currency, slowing the pace of foreign imports and
borrowing, and slowing the entry and exit of portfolio investment. Governments
should be cautious when adopting capital flow regulation policies such as “speed
bumps and “trip wires” because of substantial decreases of both domestic and
foreign investment that such regulations could bring. It is also impossible for “trip
wires” to alert policy makers to economic risk in every situation which makes
early warning systems such as “trip wires” ineffective.224
The countries of Chile, Columbia, and Brazil have used strict regulation
and control to manage exchange rates and capital inflows. What is known as the
“Chilean model” was created in the early 1990s as a program of inflow
management. Under this model the Chilean government created a foreign loan
tax of 1.2 % per year, maintained a banded exchange rate, and only allowed
pension funds to invest 12 % of their assets abroad. Under this capital control
regime foreign loans also faced a tax of 1.2 % per year and Chilean authorities
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imposed a non-interest bearing reserve requirement of 30% on all types of
external credit and foreign financial investment.225
It is believed that by negating the risk of capital flight and the likelihood of
a sudden foreign investment that Chile might have avoided currency crisis and
other economic shocks that plagued similar developing economics during the
time period. By essentially managing and restricting risky and foreign investment,
Chile mitigated many of the perceived risks that come with uncontrolled capital
flows. Columbia followed a similar strategy during the time period and required
that non-interest bearing reserves of 47% be held for one year against short term
foreign loans. During this time in Columbia, foreign borrowing related to real
estate and the foreign purchase of debt was also restricted.226
Brazil adopted a similar strategy as well after the 2008 world financial
crisis. The Brazilians adopted of foreign investment tax of 2% in 2009 and then
raised that tax to 6% in 2010 to prevent foreign capital outflows after originally
facilitating an increase of foreign investment in 2008. These capital controls
imposed by three respective emerging economies protected their economies
from capital out flows and potential currency crisis leaving them in control of
policy. The problem is that in a global economy the restriction of foreign
investments leads to a decrease in foreign investment, which eventually resulted
in the abandonment of strict capital controls in each country. A rising current
account deficit in Chile and a radical reduction in capital in-flows led to the
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abandonment of capital controls in that economy. Eventually capital started to
poor out of Brazil, leading to a depreciation in its currency and the abandonment
of capital controls as well.227
While some form of capital control is needed in the floating exchange rate
system, such as a “Tobin Tax,” harsh restrictions imposed by governments such
as Brazil and Chile are just not viable options in a globally dependent world.
While harsh restrictions can control capital out-flows, it will also restrict needed
foreign investment and capital in-flows. While harsh restrictions are more
sustainable in developing economies, in advanced economies, they would act as
a hindrance. Unmanageable capital flows that can be a perceived weakness of
the floating exchange are best regulated by moderate proportional taxes and not
harsh restrictions against any foreign capital movement.
While countries may try to loosely maintain a set of rules or global
standard when it comes to a time of crisis or an opportunity for great benefit, a
country will defect from the collective whole and act as an independent nation. In
the face of crisis, the gold standard could not be maintained by countries who
were trying to act in a way to help the people of their country. Today’s floating
exchange system came into being because of countries acting independently
and will remain the dominant financial system for the foreseeable future because
it allows for independence during crisis and benefit, especially if the country
happens to be a world power.
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The current managed floating exchange system is the culmination of the
previous international systems and is much more stable and workable then it
seems. The floating exchange system may not be the perfect financial system
and has its flaws, but these flaws are more easily corrected and recoverable than
in the two previous international systems. The current floating exchange system
has become more restrictive and managed over time proving its adaptability to
change. It is the floating system’s ability to adapt that makes it the system best
suited to deal with future turmoil and constant political change that characterizes
the new truly globally interdependent financial system.228
The floating international exchange system has now been the international
system longer then the Bretton Woods Systems proving its relative longevity in
international finance. While the system has changed over time to adapt with
stricter exchange rate bands and new computerized technologies, the free
floating system is stronger than most realize. The free floating system gives
countries and central bank’s independence to determine their own fates whether
it negatively or positivity effects the rest of the world and that is what provides
this free floating exchange rate system with such flexibility and the ability to
remain a viable system.229 The floating exchange rate system will remain the
international monetary system for the foreseeable future until a system that is
more adaptable and has fewer flaws is created and implemented. Floating
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exchange rates provide the best option in a world where politics has a major
influence over economics and interdependence characterizes global economics.
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